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INTRODUCTION
Principles of federalism and the proper ordering of state and federal relations have
long directed the United States Supreme Court's approach to federal litigation.' The
Court consistently has recognized that to properly maintain a federal system of govern-
ment the federal judiciary must respect state government authority. 2 Toward this end
the Court has established various protective devices, among them exhaustion and ab-
stention principles, with an eye to directing certain disputes to the states for resolution
instead of allowing the federal judiciary to immediately intercedes But following the
expansive interpretation of Title 42 United States Code, section 1983, 1 the Court has
found it more difficult to maintain balance between the federal and state judiciaries. 5
See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4251-
4255 (1978 & Supp. 1987).
2 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (federalism represents "a system in which there
is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States").
3 See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 3l2 U.S. 496 (1941) (federal court should
abstain from deciding state law issue until state courts render interpretation); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal court should not enjoin state criminal proceeding); Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986) (federal court should not enjoin
state civil rights commission proceedings); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (federal court should not enjoin lawyer disciplinary proceedings); Trainor
v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (extending Younger to state civil action); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327 (1977) (extending Younger to state civil contempt proceeding); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975) (extending Younger to civil action to close movie house as a nuisance); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (applying Younger to federal declaratory judgment in state criminal
proceeding); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (federal
court should abstain from deciding state law issue until state courts render interpretation); Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (abstention principle extends to diversity
suits); Burford v. Sun Oil Co„ 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (abstention proper where state law decided by
state agency); McCord v. Louisville & N.R.R., 183 U.S. 483 (1902) (exhaustion required in relation
to state administrative process); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209
(1938) (same); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (same). Congress also imposed
federalistic restraints through legislation such as the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982),
and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), For a more detailed discussion of federalism
in this regard, see Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94
YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention
Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
4 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). The section states
in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United Sti'nes or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U,S.C. § 1983.
5 The Supreme Court has found that exhaustion principles do not apply to cases brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Moreover, comity itself is no
bar to immediate relief under § 1983. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) ("the
federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked"); with Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v.
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For this reason, the Court has looked for other methods to properly allocate dispute
resolution between the federal and state courts. Among the Court's most recent efforts
lies a trilogy of cases, Parrott v. Taylor," Hudson v. Palmer,? and Daniels v. Williams.8
The problem addressed in each of these three cases involves the use of the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause to convert state common law tort claims involving
governmental agents into federal civil rights cases. Due process forms the basis of the
underlying constitutional right because in a tort context it is generally impossible for a
state to provide process prior to the injury." Hence, the argument is that the injury, the
deprivation, is inflicted without prior process and thereby without due process of law."'
The Court in Parrott, Hudson and Daniels properly recognized that this use of the
due process clause would effectively federalize all personal injury or property damage
claims against governmental employees." The Court warned that the due process clause
could become a "font of tort law ." and destroy the proper balance in dispute allocation
between state and federal courts. The Court thus attempted, in both Parrott and Hudson,
to avoid this re-ordering or, perhaps better put "disordering," of federal-state relations
by permitting the postponement of process. Where a governmental agent tortiously
injures an individual, the Court determined, due process is not offended until and unless
the state fails to provide a remedy.' 3 Soon after Hudson, however, the Court discovered
this analysis could not do what was intended." Rather than apportioning dispute reso-
lution, the Parrait-Hudson postponement-of-process analysis merely refocused the federal
question. No longer was the agent's conduct the concern, but the state's remedy formed
the basis of the federal inquiry.' 5 Hence, in Daniels the Court reassessed its position in
Parrott and again attempted to work a solution. The solution offered by Daniels is simple:
negligent conduct does not implicate due process. Thus, with Daniels, the Court has
successfully deflected at least some common law torts from the federal courts.
This Article explores the Court's attempts in Parrott, Hudson, and Daniels to achieve
a workable solution to the problem of properly apportioning dispute resolution under
McNary, 454 U.S. 100,116 (1981) (holding principles of comity apply where § 1983 action challenges
tax assessment scheme). In addition, the Court has found that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1982), does not preclude a federal court from enjoining a state court proceeding under
§ 1983. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242-43 (1972). As Younger v. Harris made clear, however,
basic federalism concerns still act to limit actions brought under § 1983.401 U.S. 37 (1971). See
generally Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights — Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away? 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985).
6 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
7 468 U.S. 517 (1984). See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
106 S. Ct. 662 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 138-84.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 42-44.
l° See infra text accompanying notes 42-44,77-79.
11 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535-36; Parrott, 451 U.S. at 544.
12 See Parma, 451 U.S. at 544 ("To accept respondent's argument that the conduct of the state
officials in this case constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment would almost necessarily
result in turtling every alleged injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under
`color of law' into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cognizable under § 1983. It is hard to
perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of reasoning . Such reasoning 'would make of
the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may
already be administered by the States."') (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,701 (1976)).
"Hudson, 468 U.S. at 536.
14 See, e,g., Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665; Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668,670 (1986).
15 See infra notes 193-228 and accompanying text.
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the federal system. The Article concludes that although the Court has adopted a sound
premise in attempting to deflect certain cases from the federal courts — that due process
should not become a "font of tort law" — it has been unsuccessful in constructing a
workable model to achieve this goal. Specifically, both Parrott and Hudson reflect ill-fated
applications of state action theoryl" which at best simply delay the federal question and
at worst seriously jeopardize traditional tort law. Daniels, in contrast, though from a
practical standpoint offering a more manageable and less dangerous solution to the
problem, nevertheless remains woefully incomplete.' 7
The Court has failed to recognize that the problem of converting state tort claims
into viable federal actions is not a function of any one legal theory. Rather, the problem
arises out of three separate yet concurring legal developments: first, the ever-broadening
interpretation of section 1983, particularly relaxation of exhaustion doctrine; second,
the construction of state action theory which charges the state with not only authorized
action, but also the unauthorized and even illegal action of its agents; and finally, the
blossoming of due process in its procedural sense, the principle emerging that process
is generally due prior to any adverse governmental action."
Only by linking these three developments does the possibility of converting state
tort claims into federal actions ever materialize, since the absence of any one would
effectively alleviate the problem. For example, a narrower construction of section 1983
could restrict the federal remedy, thereby limiting the federal avenue of relief.'" Retract-
ing state action theory by imputing only authorized conduct to the state would likewise
defeat the federal action. Without state action there would exist no underlying violation,
and consequently no cognizable claim under section 1983. 2" Finally, altering due process
theory could also deflect federal actions by simply undermining the protected right.
Again, with no underlying federal violation there could be no section 1983 claim. 21
Consequently, three options present themselves, any one of which could successfully
provide a solution to the problem of constitutionalizing tort law. The Court, however,
has repeatedly refused to give any sort of restrictive interpretation to section 1983, a
position it reasserted in Parra11. 22 Hence, when faced with the possibility of converting
state law into federal law in Parma and Hudson, the Court effectively limited itself to a
choice between either of two solutions. The Court could have either reassessed its concept
of state action or attempted to refine due process. Unfortunately, the Court did neither.
instead, it bastardized both alternatives by skewing the concept of state action," and
then, without considering the consequences, applying due process."
This Article submits that by either wholly reassessing state action theory or thor-
oughly analyzing due process the Court could have achieved a workable solution to the
problem of federalizing common law claims. Though the decision in Daniels corrected
this deficiency in the Parrait-Hudson analysis by attempting to refine notions of due
process, the resulting model is imperfect and does not address the whole problem.
16 See infra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
' 7 See infra notes 370-82 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 52-54,265-75 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 276-325 and accompanying text.
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This Article suggests that although three possible solutions to the problem of con-
stitutionalizing tort law exist, due process itself, and not section 1983 or state action
theory, should be reexamined in an effort to prevent the federalization of common law
claims. 25 Though state action theory, if drastically altered, could achieve a workable
solution, such an approach would strike far beyond the contours of the problem. The
same would prove true if section 1983 were to be given a restricted reading. The more
judicious approach is to reevaluate due process, for therein lies the answer.
This Article concludes that procedural due process was misapplied in Parr-ail and
Hudson, and improperly interpreted in Daniels. Procedural due process is not relevant
in every case where the plaintiff asserts a protected interest. Rather, it is only material
in those situations where either the state or its agent possesses an "opportunity" to afford
prior process,26 and where a "reason" for supplying that process exists." Thus, in Parrott
and Daniels there existed no procedural due process violation because there was no
opportunity for prior process. Parrott was therefore wrong to the extent that it found
that procedural due process required a state remedy, while Daniels effectively erred in
its reasoning of why procedural clue process was not a concern. Hudson, in turn, pre-
sented no procedural due process violation because no reason for prior process existed
in that case.
Toward this end, Part I of this Article explores the basic problem presented in
Parma and Hudson. This part includes an illustration of the problem in generic form"
together with a study of relevant due process cases up to and including both Parrott and
Hudson. 29 Part II examines the Court's solution to the problem found in Daniels." I n this
part, Daniels is critically evaluated and an explanation is offered for the Court's change
of direction. Part III then returns to Parrott and Hudson in an attempt to demonstrate
the errors found in those cases, and to further establish that the Daniels solution is
unnecessary once these errors are corrected." In order to correct the errors underlying
Parrott and Hudson this part offers an alternative solution, one accentuating the rationale
behind procedural due process. 32 Finally, Part IV of this Article presents recent devel-
opments regarding substantive due process, the expectation being that those interests
left unprotected by procedural due process may find a safe haven in other provisions of
the Constitution."
1. CONVERTING TORT INTO ABSENCE OF PROCESS
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states front
"deprivringl any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ...." 34
This language establishes the underlying principle that before a state takes a person's
23 See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 276-310,327-69 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 31 1-23.327-69 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 58- 137 and accompanying text.
"See it notes 138-265 and accompanying text.
5 ' See infra notes 265-392 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 326-69 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 383-434 and accompanying text.
34 U.S. CONS'''. amend. XIV, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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life, liberty, or property, some process must be afforded that individual." Process, in
turn, generally means notice and an opportunity to be heard." The reason for this
requirement is quite simple: to insure that the state, when it decides to act, does so in
accordance with established substantive rules. 37 Without prior process, the risk exists that
the state might erroneously deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. Process brings
fairness and confidence to the state's enforcement decision." To illustrate this concept,
suppose that a state decides to engage in urban renewal and passes a law which requires
demolition of all houses built before the year 1900. Procedural due process requires that
before the state sends out its bulldozers, individualized process be afforded to determine
those homes that were built before the given year, and those that were not. Hence, a
homeowner must be given notice of the state's decision to demolish her home and must
be afforded the opportunity to present facts pertaining to its age. The hearing helps
35 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) ("ordinarily, due
process of law requires an opportunity for 'some kind of hearing' prior to the deprivation of a
significant property interest"); Regents v. Roth, 409 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972) ("Before a person is
deprived of a protected interest, he [or she] must be afforded opportunity for some kind of hearing,
'except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies
postponing the hearing until after the event—) (citation omitted); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542
(1971) ("it is fundamental that except in emergency situations ... due process requires that when
a State seeks to terminate (a protected) interest , , it must afford 'notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective"). See also
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) ("it has become a truism that 'some form
of hearing' is required before the owner is finally deprived of a protected property interest")
(citation omitted); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pan-all, 451 U.S. at 540 ("Our past
cases mandate that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a State finally deprives a
person of his [or her] property interests.").
The exceptions to this proposition are explored later in this article. See, e.g., Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For a more thorough
discussion, see infra notes 70, 286-305 and accompanying text.
3" See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there
can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.").
37 Conversely, where no substantive rules exist, there is no reason for process. For example,
the Court found, in Board of Regents v. Roth, that because no legitimate claim of entitlement to
public employment existed, no substantive rule had to be followed; therefore, no constitutional
requirement regarding process existed. 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
" Procedural theory applies in like fashion to the federal government through the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Because this Article
addresses Parrott v. Taylor and its "adequate state remedy" approach to procedural due process, the
procedural theory addressed here will focus on the states and not the federal government. But the
approach advanced by this Article should apply with full force to the federal government. Indeed,
even though Pan-au itself is partially grounded in federalism concerns, courts have applied it to
actions of federal officials. See, e.g., Rodriquez-Mora v. Baker, 792 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986)
("we hold that Parrott v. Taylor and its progeny apply with full force to cases brought under the
Fifth Amendment due process clause"); Stalnaker v. Boeing Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1291, 231 Cal.
Rptr. '323 (1986) (finding Parrott applicable to federal officials, yet holding that stare workers
compensation law provided adequate remedy). Similarly, and perhaps with sounder reasoning,
courts have also applied Daniels to actions of federal officials. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. United
States, 813 F.2c1 1273, 1278 (4th Cir. 1987); Stalnaker, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1291, 231 Cal. Rptr. at
332-33.
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insure that the state, acting in accordance with its substantive rule, demolishes only those
houses actually built before 1900.
Substantive due process, in contrast, assesses the propriety of a state's substantive
decision. Though the contours of this substantive evaluation are hard to mark, the
underlying theory is quite simple, at least once one becomes comfortable with the idea
that the will of the majority may not always prevail. The rationale behind substantive
due process is that there are certain normative decisions the state simply cannot make
regardless of the majority's wishes and regardless of any process. Using the illustration
outlined above, one might challenge the law's substance by claiming that the state has
no right to demolish a house based on the year of its construction." The argument is
that even if the state supplied process in its adjudicative sense, its substantive rule is still
invalid.
When speaking solely in terms of "the state," the illustration as outlined above
remains quite simple. The state, however, as an artificial entity, only acts through its
agents — human beings. The United States Supreme Court held long ago, in Home
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, that when an agent acts on the state's
behalf, she is in effect "the state," even when site acts beyond the scope of her duties,
and even when the state expressly declares her actions illegal." Therefore, under both
procedural and substantive due process, an individual's actions might be unconstitutional,
even without the state's approval or acquiescence, and even in spite of its prior disap-
proval. Instructive again is the hypothetical law requiring demolition of all houses built
before the year 1900. Suppose that state law also required notice and a full-fledged
hearing prior to any action, and further suppose that the bulldozer operator, acting
under cloak of state law, demolished a home before the homeowner received notice.
The state, through its laws, has satisfied procedural due process. It intended and required
that the homeowner receive process. Through its actor, however, the state has violated
procedural due process.'" The problem thus bifurcates under modern principles of state
action: the state both does and does not satisfy due process.
'' A challenge might also be based on the takings clause of the fifth amendment, as applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232
(1987). Based on this challenge, assuming a "taking" is found to have occurred, just compensation
must he paid. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987). Before a federal claim for relief "ripens," however, the plaintiff must exhaust all state
remedial procedures, including any state action for inverse condemnation. Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). Consequently, as noted
by the Court in Hamilton Bank, analysis under the takings clause is virtually identical to that applied
under the due process clause in Parratt and Hudson.
40 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913). See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961) ("Congress
has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge
of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their
authority or misuse it."); Home Tel. & Tel., 227 U.S. at 287 ("the theory of the [Fourteenth}
Amendment is that where an officer or other representative of a State in the exercise of the
authority with which he is clothed misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the
Amendment, inquiry concerning whether the State has authorized the wrong is irrelevant and the
Federal judicial power is competent to afford redress for the wrong by dealing with the officer and
the result of his exertion of power"). See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Roberts v. Acres, 495
F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1974).
41 But see Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304 (Me. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1018
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Moreover, a state official when acting on behalf of the state might possess any one
of a number of mental states.42
 Consider once again the aforementioned hypothetical,
and further suppose the bulldozer operator did not intend to demolish the house. Again,
the state through its laws satisfied procedural due process. The state, through its actor,
however, provided no prior process, giving neither notice nor a hearing. Therefore,
arguably the homeowner has been deprived of property without due process of law,
even though neither the state official nor the state had a chance to provide prior
process.43
One quickly realizes that if this argument were accepted, then every time a state
actor tortiously injured another in person or property a constitutional violation would
occur. 44
 The nature of tort is such that prior process is almost never readily available,
and thus every injury inflicted by a state actor, regardless of state law requirements,
could be characterized as a procedural clue process violation. The result would be a
veritable federalization of state tort law in cases where a government official is somehow
responsible for injury. That such a result conflicts with common notions of federalism 45
appears unassailable, if for no other reason than because a new federal tort law would
he superimposed on that already in place in the states. The problem, therefore, is easily
identified — how to avoid the federalization of all common law tort claims brought
against state actors so as to preserve traditional tort principles adopted by the states.
(1985). In Gregory, state law required notice and a hearing prior to the denial of general assistance
benefits. Id. at 1307. See also infra notes 121, 327, and 381 for a discussion of Gregory. Town officials,
who were charged with administering the plan, however, failed to provide prior notice to an
individual who was denied benefits. Id. at 1305. Hence, though the state satisfied procedural due
process through its laws, it arguably did not through its agents, the town officials. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine ultimately found no due process violation, holding that Parratt controlled
and that state remedies would suffice. Id. at 1308.
Likewise, in Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Serv., Inc., agents of the state failed to
provide a prior hearing to one being involuntarily committed to a mental hospital even though
state law required such a hearing. 804 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated and reh'g en Lanz
granted, 812 F.2d 1339 (1987) (discussed infra notes 327 and 381). Thus, although state law satisfied
due process, the slate action — here the conduct of the agents — arguably did not. As in Gregory,
the court in Burch found that Parratt dictated the outcome of the case. Burch, 804 F.2d at 1557.
Contrast Messick v. Leavins, which involved the intentional destruction of property by municipal
agents without notice in a manner inconsistent with state law, a law that arguably satisfied due
process by requiring some form of prior notice. 811 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir. 1987). See also infra notes
217 and 381. The court in Messick concluded that irrespective of the state law, the municipal policy
violated procedural due process, and further found that Parratt was not controlling. Messick, 811
F,2d at 1442-43. The court instead held that the destruction took place pursuant to an established
municipal procedure. Id. at 1443. This procedure was inconsistent with state law, and thus prior
process which had not been afforded was required. Id. at 1442-43 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)). As this Article demonstrates, the result in Messick is correct. In
any event, the Parratt holding should not even have been a problem in any of these cases simply
because the deprivations were not unauthorized. What was unauthorized was the failure to provide
process, a wholly different problem. See also infra notes 337-77 and accompanying text.
42 Contrast Parratt, 451 U.S. at 525 (finding that due process.requires no specific mental state)
with Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 663 (holding simple negligence not enough to implicate due process).
43 As this Article later makes clear, Pan-alt attempted to solve this problem by holding that post-
deprivation remedies satisfy procedural due process. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
After the Daniels decision, simple negligence does not implicate due process in the first instance.
See infra notes 138-84 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
45 See supra note 1.
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•Solving the problem has proved more difficult than stating it. Because section 1983
provides the primary vehicle for redressing constitutional violations, a plausible solution
would be to limit that relief mechanism, thereby preventing federalization of the claim . 46
Though such a solution might work, it suffers two major obstacles. First, the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to give section 1983 a limiting construction and has,
instead, methodically over the years given it a more and more expansive reading. For
instance, in Monroe v. Pape47 the Court held that section 1983 could be used to remedy
conduct of state officials found abusive even under state law, thus drawing a direct
parallel to the result in Home Telephone & Telegraph." Later, the Court in Monett v. New
York City Department of Social Services extended section 1983 liability to reach municipalities
as well as the agents they employ. 45 Even Parratt gave section 1983 an expansive reading,
finding it imposed no independent mens rea requirement before allowing recovery.r° In
addition, the Court in Patsy v. Board of Regents found that section 1983 does not require
exhaustion of available state administrative remedies, 5 ' and accordingly permitted the
plaintiff immediate access to federal court. Second, and perhaps more importantly, a
narrowing construction of section 1983 conceivably could affect all constitutional claims,
and not just those involving due process. Therefore, even if the Court were willing to
somehow narrow its interpretation of section 1983, this approach would be drastic
indeed, for it could de-federalize a large number of claims worthy of federal protection.
Another plausible solution rests in completely overhauling Home Telephone & Tele-
graph's concept of state action. In that case the Court found that:
[A] state officer cannot on the one hand as a means of doing a wrong
forbidden by the [Fourteenth] Amendment proceed upon the assumption
of the possession of state power and at the same time for the purpose of
avoiding the application of the Amendment, deny the power and thus ac-
complish the wrong. 52
Altering state action theory to do away with the Court's conclusion in Home Telephone &
Telegraph would resolve the problem, since as a general matter torts are unauthorized.
Without state action the tort would be just that — a tort, and nothing else. 55 This
approach, however, like that of narrowing section 1983, would implicate most all con-
" See, e.g., Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 429 (1977) (sug-
gesting that 1983 might be read narrowly so as not to embrace all liberty and property interests);
Blackmun, supra note 5, at 23 (recognizing that § 1983 itself might be read in a more restrictive
fashion); Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. I, 7-9
(1982) (criticizing Parrott Court's•interpretation of § 1983).
47 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
4 a See supra note 40.
49 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
su Parran, 451 U.S. at 535. But see discussion infra note 83 and accompanying text.
51 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
62 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288 (1913).
" Section 1983 is merely a remedial device, the application of which turns on the violation of'
some federally protected right, whether statutory or constitutional. See Maine v. Thiborot,448
U.S. 1, 7 (1980). For there to be a violation of the fourteenth amendment, the primary repository
of protected rights, there must be some form of state action. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). See generally Gicnnon & Nowak, A
Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. RF,v, 221.
Because the fourteenth amendment is the primary underlying right used in relation to 1983, the,
absence of' state action would undermine the right and also the remedy under that statute.
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stitutional constraints. 54
 Hence, again this would be a drastic solution to the problem,
one that, as this Article will establish, is wholly unnecessary.
The final solution, and that ostensibly adopted by the Court in Parrott and Hudson,
is to define due process in a way that avoids constitutionalizing common law tort claims."
As evident from Parrott, Hudson, and Daniels, however, this is easier said than done. In
Parrott and Hudson the Court purported to limit due process by providing post-depri-
vation remedies. But, as evinced by Daniels, this methodology is inherently flawed. At
hest it merely delays the federal question by refocusing judicial scrutiny on the after-
the-fact remedy instead of the plaintiff's injury, and by so doing seriously threatening
well-established immunity doctrine." At worst, the post-deprivation remedy rationale
converts procedure into substance," defining a substantive right to be free from gov-
ernment-inflicted injury. Daniels presents a welcome change in direction, with the Court
focusing exclusively on the heart of the matter — due . process.
A. The Due Process Explosion: Groundwork for Parratt
The 1970s marked a renaissance in procedural due process. Beginning with Goldberg
v. Kelly," the Supreme Court began to unravel arcane distinctions between rights and
privileges, only the former traditionally receiving procedural protection in the courts. 59
Instead of continuing this semantic exercise, the Court substituted the unified principle
that before a state takes adverse action against a person it must afford prior process. 6°
" The only constitutional limitation left unaffected would be that found in the thirteenth
amendment, the prohibition of slavery. State action is not a requirement in this regard. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812-13 (3d ed. 1986).
w See, e.g., Blackmun, supra note 5, at 22. ("Many complaints about § I983's ostensible impact
on federalism really are complaints about the breadth of the underlying constitutional rights — a
separate issue that surely deserves to be debated on its own terms.").
56 See infra notes 193-228 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 276-305 and accompanying text.
s" 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
59 Not until the Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth was the "right/privilege" distinction
finally laid to rest: "the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights'
and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights." 408
U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (footnote omitted). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
Years earlier, the Court reached an analogous conclusion in relation to the first amendment in
Sherbert II. Verner. There, the Court held that a Jehovah's Witness was denied the right of free
exercise of religious beliefs because South Carolina refused her unemployment compensation after
she was discharged for refusing to work on her Sabbath. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). The Court
found that though there exists no "right" to unemployment compensation, the constitution still
applies. Id. The Court rejected a recent attempt to revive the right/privilege distinction in the first
amendment context, albeit in a different manner, just this past term, Compare Bowen v. Roy, 106
S. Ct. 2147, 2152 (Burger, C.J.) (plurality opinion found a clear distinction between the freedom
of individual belief, which is an absolute right, and the freedom of' individual conduct, which is not
absolute but. rather a privilege in nature) with Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S.
Ct. 1046, 1051 (1987) (Court found that first amendment protects the free exercise of employees'
religious beliefs).
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63. Situations in which the Court has found process required prior
to adverse governmental action include termination of public employment, Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); suspension from public liigh school, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574
(1975); termination of public utilities, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,_436 U.S. 1, 6
(1978); revocation of a prisoner's good time credits, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974);
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But only a short time passed before the Court, or at least part of it, saw a need to
establish limits, lest federal law swallow all of state law under the guise of due process.°'
The Court has employed two techniques in order to avoid this subjugation of state
law: one definitional and the other more analytical in nature.°2 First, the Court has given
a restrictive meaning to both "property" and "liberty"° 3 so as to avoid implicating due
process." This approach, of course, has generated lively debate among commenta-
tors, as the traditional thought had been that the phrase "life, liberty and property"
encompassed "every individual interest worth talking about."° , That debate notwith-
standing, the Court has successfully limited the reach of due process under this analysis,
as evidenced in a series of cases in the 1970s, including Board of Regents v. Roth,"
revocation of parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); denial of parole in certain
situations, Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979); and transfer within a prison to administrative segregation, Hurwitz v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
466 (1983).
6 ' See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699 (1976). In Paul, the Court expressed the need to
limit due process in the tort context, lest it become a mere "font of tort law." Id. at 701. Justice
Brennan disagreed entirely with the majority's position. See id. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"° Another approach, also definitional in nature, attempted to allow the state or federal gov-
ernment to define the substantive right so as to include whatever procedural protections were also
created. See Arnette v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). This approach, however, never captured a
majority of the Court, and was finally laid to rest in Cleveland Rd, of Educ. v. Loudermill, where the
Court concluded that the procedural protection created by the law defining the right is not the
limit of procedural protection required by clue process. 470 U.S. 532. 540 (1985).
63 In defining property interests, the Court has made it clear that it looks only to state law or,
where the federal government is involved, to federal statutory law. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
The Constitution itself creates no property interests. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, Liberty interests, in
contrast, may arise under state law (see Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12), federal non-constitutional law,
or constitutional law. See Goss, 419 U,S. at 574, For a partial list of federally protected liberty
interests, see Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 ("Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God ... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men [or women].") (citation omitted). The interest in "life" appears
inherently self-defined, though it may be subject to a broader reading. But see Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (perhaps "life" is subject to a narrower interpretation).
64 See, e.g., Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Paul v.
Davis.
11' Monaghan, supra note 46, at 406-07. Interestingly, this same approach has been raised
recently in relation to substantive due process, In Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, a student
was dismissed from school after he failed an exam. 474 U:S. 214, 216 (1985). The student challenged
his dismissal, claiming it was arbitrary and capricious, thus violating substantive due process. Id. at
217. The Court, assuming that a protected interest existed, found no substantive due process
violation. Id. at 223. See infra notes 408-11 and accompanying text. Justice Powell, however, found
the claimed property right "dubious at best." He stated:
Even if one assumes the existence of a property right, however, not every such right
is entitled to the protection of substantive due process. While property interests are
protected by procedural due process even though the interest is derived from state
law rather than the Constitution, ... substantive due process rights are created only
by the Constitution.
474 U.S. at 220 (Powell, J., concurring).
66 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the Court found that to have a protected property interest in
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Bishop v. Wood, 67 Codd v. Velger and, perhaps most significantly, the 1976 case of
Paul v. Davis."
As pointed out above, the alternative technique employed by the Court in restricting
the reach of procedural due process is more analytical than definitional in nature. This
approach recognizes that due process applies — that is, a protected interest exists — but
under certain circumstances allows the process to come after the deprivation. Basically,
allowing for postponement of process reflects a compromise, reached through balancing
the state's interests in acting without prior process with the individual's interest in the
uninterrupted enjoyment of life, liberty, or property. In Mathews v. Eldridge this balancing
approach was expressed in terms of three considerations: first, the nature of the pro-
tected interest; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation in the absence of a prior
hearing; and third, the public interest in administrative efficiency. 7 °
The Court has used the definitional approach to limit due process in relation to
only one tort — defamation. In Paul v. Davis the Court found that there existed no
liberty interest in being free from defamatory remarks made by the government. 71
Therefore, when a state injures a person's reputation no procedural problem arises
because no protected interest exists. When the state has physically injured a person or
property, however, the Court has avoided definitional limitations of due process, and
has instead turned to post-deprivation process analysis. In Ingraham v. Wright, a school
paddling case, as a definitional matter the Court found a liberty interest in being free
from any "appreciable physical pain." 72 The Court, however, used the Mathews balancing
public employment one must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the job. Id. at 578. Roth
also rejected any notion that a protected liberty interest exists incident to public employment. Id.
at 577.
67 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Bishop established that liberty protects one only from public disclosure
of disparaging remarks about one's character. Id. at 348. Bishop was a partial response to allusions
found in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, where the Court suggested that a general liberty interest might
exist in one's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity." 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1970). See also Codd
v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
6' 429 U.S. 624 (1977). In Codd, the Court found a liberty interest in being free from only false
information disclosed by the state concerning one's character. Id. at 627. Codd can be criticized as
mixing substance with procedure, in that the requirement that the disclosure prove false involves
the merits, or substance, of the claim. Justice Stevens forcefully made this objection in his dissenting
opinion. See 429 U.S. at 631-32, 635 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The criticism is well taken, because
truth or falsity should have no bearing on whether there need be a hearing; it should only have
relevance to the amount of damages. Contrast Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) ("Because
the right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense that it does not depend upon the
merits of a claimant's substantive assertions ... we believe that the denial of procedural due process
should be actionable ... without proof of actual injury.") (footnote omitted). See generally infra notes
299-305 and accompanying text.
69 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Essentially, the Paul decision established that no liberty interest exists
in being free from defamation; rather, some other interest must be implicated. Id. at 701. See also
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143 (1979) (innocence of charge "largely irrelevant to [plaintiff's]
claim of deprivation of liberty"). Therefore, for example, the loss of government employment,
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); or the loss of the right to drink alcohol, Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); along with the alleged defamation would be sufficient to give
rise to a procedural due process claim.
79 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
71 Paul 424 U.S. at 701. See also supra note 69.
72 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977). The actions complained of in Ingraham involved severe corporal
punishment of junior high school students. One of the students "paddled" suffered a hematoma
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approach to conclude that state common law remedies satisfied clue process." Now,
whether some discernable difference exists between reputation and bodily integrity that
justifies the different approaches the Court took in Paul and Ingrakim is an intriguing
question that will not be addressed here. For whatever reason, the Court has been
unwilling to impose Paul's definitional constraints in cases involving injury to person or
property, a position this Article readily embraces. 74 Instead, where the harm is more
tangible, such as the personal injury in Ingraham or the property loss in Parralt and
Hudson, the Court has accepted the protected nature of the interest and looked to post-
deprivation process analysis for answers. This Article will demonstrate, however, that
although this inquiry was relevant in Ingraham, it was not in Parratt and Hudson.
13. Parratt v. Taylor
Parratt v. Taylor has been characterized by one commentator as "one of the most
significant cases brought under section 1983 of the last decade."" The facts of the case,
however, hardly seem to support such acclaim. An inmate of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex ordered a hobby kit, valued at $23.50, by mail." After delivery,
the kit was negligently lost by prison officials77 and the prisoner filed a section 1983
action for damages." The prisoner's claim was simple and straightforward; he asserted
that he had been deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the
requiring medical attention which kept him from school fur several clays. Another student was
struck about his arms on at least two occasions, once losing the use of an arm for a week. Id. at
657.
" Id. at 676-80. The existence of common law remedies performed two separate functions in
Ingraham. First, it helped to minimize the risk of an erroneous deprivation; second, it provided the
post-deprivation process sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. Id. An attempt to apply this same
reasoning in cases like Parratt and Hudson illustrates their fundamentally different nature. In cases
like Parratt — where the deprivation is the result of negligence, although remedies after-the-fact
might minitnize.the risk of a deprivation by encouraging care — such remedies cannot minimize
the risk of an erroneous deprivation because the injury is always "erroneous." At least an injury
cannot be justified as it was in Ingraham where there existed a common law privilege to impose
reasonable corporal punishment. Where the deprivation is the result of unjustifiable intentional
conduct as occurred in Hudson, there can again be no minimization of the risk of error because
again the action is always "erroneous." See infra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
71 See Monaghan, supra note 46, at 433 (Liberty "should be read to embrace ... any govern-
mental conduct which so invades a decent respect for a person's personal integrity that, if not fairly
justified, the result would outrage public sensibility."). Professor Monaghan also argues that "prop-
erty" has constitutional meaning. Id. at 440.
75
 Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CoNFL'.
L.Q. 545, 545 (1982). Professor Friedman also worries that taken "to its logical extreme, [Parratt]
would undermine the basis for most section 1983 cases now brought in federal court." Id. at 546.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has expressed similar concerns, stating that Parratt "could possibly
cut back the § 1983 cases by ninety percent." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 26.10 at
416 (Sapp. 1982).
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530.
" The Court accepted the negligence claim as true, but noted the uncertainty of the matter.
Id. at 537 n.3. Professor Friedman points out that if the case had been properly defended, the
district court should have dismissed it solely on the basis of the absence of any negligence on behalf
of the named parties. Friedman, supra note 75, at 550-51.
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530.
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fourteenth ainendment. 79 In other words, his property had been taken in the absence
of a prior hearing.
In analyzing this argument, the Court speaking through Justice (now Chief justice)
Rehnquist, addressed two issues. First, the Court had to determine whether a negligence
charge was sufficient to support a civil rights claim under section 1983. 80
 Noting that it
had twice before avoided the issue, 8 ' the Court held, to the surprise of many, 82
 that
negligence could support a claim under section 1983." The Court next faced the real
substance of the case, whether the state deprived the prisoner of property without due
process of law. Without this deprivation, no federal action would lie because section 1983
provides only a mechanism for redressing violation of otherwise federally protected
rights.
The Court initially determined that "the alleged loss, even though negligently
caused, amounted to a deprivation."'" Following this conclusion, the Court presented
the due process issue as a mere timing problem, as in Mathews v. Eldridge." Looking to
post-deprivation process, thé Court framed the issue as "whether the tort remedies which
the State of Nebraska provides as a means of redress for property deprivations satisfy
the requirements of procedural due process."" Turning first to precedent, the Court
found that several cases recognized that post-deprivation remedies could satisfy due
process. 87
 The Court thus concluded that:
vs Id.
" Id. at 532-34.
81 Id. at 532. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555
(1978).
02 See Nahmod, supra note 46, at 7 ("The court was clearly incorrect when it asserted that
section 1983 has no state-of-mind requirement."); Comment, Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law
Remedies: Curtailing the Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right, 43 U. Prr-r. L.
Rev. 1035, 1037 (1982) thereinafter Comment, Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law Remedies]
(applauds Parrott as "laudable precedent," but criticizes the Court for failing to limit 1983 itself,
"the real source of the problem").
"Parrott, 451 U.S. at 534-35. At least it appeared that way. For some years following Parrott,
lower courts still debated whether the Court intended that § 1983 would always provide a remedy
where injury resulted from simple negligence. Hence, courts concluded that negligence could not
support certain § 1983 claims. Daniels v, Williams, 748 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(injury to person not protectable interest), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v.
O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 826 (3d Cir. 1989) (en bane) ("negligence claims are not encompassed within
1983"), aff'd on other grounds sub nom, Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986). See infra notes
138-54 and accompanying text. See also Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir.
1982) (finding mere negligence not enough to support § 1983 claim); Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337,
340 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) (same). In contrast, see Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1947 (10th
Cir. 1985) (citing Parrott for proposition that negligence is enough to state a cause of action under
1983); Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1256 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); Lowe v. Letsinger, 772 F.2d
308, 314 (7th Cir. 1985) (same); McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1373 (10th Cir. 1984) (same);
Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206, 1209 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984). A close reading of the Court's
opinion in Parrott reveals that it never expressly stated that negligence could support a 1983
action. Parrott, 451 U.S. at 531-35.
84 451 U.S. at 536-37. Justice Powell roundly criticized this conclusion in his concurring opinion.
Id. at 547 (Powell, J., concurring). It was this part of the opinion that Daniels subsequently overruled.
106 U.S. at 665. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
85 Parrott, 451 U.S. at 537. See also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
86
 Parrott, 451 U.S. at 537.
87 Id. at 537-39. The Court relied on cases which generally involved established state proce-
dures; all were cases in which some prior hearing could have been provided. See Fuentes v. Shevin,
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[Other the necessity of' quick action by the State or the impracticability of
providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the
availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of
the State's action at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy the require-
ments of procedural due process."
Under the facts presented, the Court found it significant that the deprivation was wholly
random and did not occur pursuant to any state policy or procedure." Thus, the state
could not provide a prior hearing because it was virtually impossible to predict when
the deprivation might take place." The Court found it easy not to require predeprivation
process in "a situation such as the present one involving a tortious loss of a prisoner's
property as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee." 9 '
The Court accordingly concluded that no due process violation had been alleged. 92
Although the state had deprived the plaintiff of property, the deprivation did not occur
"as a result of some established state procedure," nor did the plaintiff "conten[d] that
the procedures themselves [were] inadequate" or that a predeprivation hearing was
otherwise practicable." Moreover, the state apparently provided a remedy through its
tort claims act which would compensate those who had suffered injury "at the hands of
the State."94 Finally, the possibility that the available state law remedies might be some-
thing less than those available in federal court did not make them constitutionally
suspect." Thus, under the facts presented, the Court concluded there was no due process
violation and, therefore, no federal claim."
Justice Powell entered a concurring opinion, one that would eventually capture a
majority of the Court. 97 He was of the view that negligent acts could not constitute
deprivations within the meaning of the due process clause; instead, only intentional acts
could violate due process." justice Powell expressed his fear that by recognizing negli-
gent acts as deprivations, the Court opened the federal forum to all ordinary tort suits."
The better approach, he argued, would be to draw the line at intentional acts, thus
disposing of the due process issue once and for all in relation to negligence, without
407 U.S. 67, (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594 (1950); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Sc Trust Cu., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944). See infra notes 284-
305 and accompanying text.
88 451 U.S. at 539 (footnote omitted).
89 Id. at 541.
99 Id.
91 Id.
97 Id. at 543.
98 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 544.
go The Court concluded: "The remedies provided could have fully compensated the respondent
for the property loss he suffered, and we hold that they are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
due process." Id. (emphasis added). The Court never stated, however, that the remedies were
necessary, although the Court in Hudson so read the Parratt decision. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 531 (1984). This is discussed more fully later in this Article. See infra notes 282-84 and
accompanying text.
97 Parma, 451 U.S. at 546 (Powell, J., concurring). See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664-
65 (1986). See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of Daniels.
98 451 U.S. at 548 (Powell,,., dissenting) ("a 'deprivation' connotes an intentional act").
99 Id. at 550 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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having to worry about adequate state remedies."' Although no other justice joined with
Justice Powell in Parrall, just five years later he would convince the Court he was
correct. 101
Justice Blackmun also filed a concurring opinion in which he emphasized the "nar-
row reach" of the Court's holding.'° 2 He first stated, "I do not read the Court's opinion
as applicable to a case concerning deprivation of life or of liberty." 105 He continued:
"Most importantly, I do not understand the Court to suggest that the provision of
'postdeprivation remedies' ... within a state system would cure the unconstitutional
nature of a state official's intentional act that deprives a person of property."I 04
C. Hudson v. Palmer
Hudson v. Palmer was another prisoner's rights case involving a simple property
loss.'" This loss, however, was not the result of negligence, but was a consequence of
intentional conduct. 116 In Hudson, a prisoner at Virginia's Bland Correctional Center
alleged that during a "shakedown" of his cell prison authorities destroyed certain non-
contraband property) 07 After rejecting the inmate's fourth amendment claim,'" the
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, addressed the due process issue.
In relation to due process the Court found no logical distinction between negligent
and intentional acts. Both types of acts are random when viewed from the state's per-
spective, and in either case the state has no opportunity to provide a predeprivation
hearing)" Responding to the argument that the state actor could provide such a hearing
because the actor knows what he intends to do, the Court stated: "The controlling
inquiry is solely whether the stale is in a position to provide for a predeprivation pro-
cess." 110 Thus, the Court drew a distinction between what a state official does and what
mo Id. at 548-50 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell based his conclusion both on the reasons
supporting the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, and the language used in that clause.
Id. at 548 & n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). Specifically, in relation to the language used, Justice Powell
argued that the word "deprive" connotes only intentional deprivations, citing Webster's Dictionary.
Id. Contrast justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Daniels and Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 677,678-80.
See infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
1 ° 1 See Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 663-67. See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Daniels. Justice Stewart and Justice White also offered short concurring opinions in
Parrett. 451 U.S. at 544 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 545 (White, J., concurring).
102
 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun further stated: "I continue to believe that
there are certain governmental actions that, even if undertaken with a full panoply of procedural
protection, are, in and of themselves, antithetical to fundamental notions of due process." Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971)).
I'm Parrott, 451 U.S. at 545-46. Justice Blackmun apparently later retracted  this in view of the
Court's holding in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,536 (1984). See infra note 168 and accompanying
text.
'°' Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520.
1 °.6 Id.
107 Id.
100
 Id. at 530..The Court found that an inmate possesses no legitimate expectation of privacy
in his or her prison cell, and consequently that the fourth amendment was inapplicable to the facts
of the case. Id,
1 " Id. at 533.
110 Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
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he fails to do. Although a state official's intentional act will be imputed to the state for
the purposes of satisfying the state action requirement, his failure to provide a hearing,
even when possible, will not.'" Based on this reasoning and its interpretation of Parratt,
the Court concluded that an adequate state remedy satisfies due process. 112 The Court
found Virginia's remedial scheme adequate because the tortfeasor apparently was not
protected by sovereign immunity, leaving the prisoner free to seek redress in the state
courts.'"
Justice Stevens concurred in part, though expressing a limited disclaimer: 114
I do not understand the Court's holding to apply to conduct that violates a
substantive constitutional right actions governmental officials may not take
no matter what procedural protections accompany them, or to cases in
which it is contended that the established prison procedures themselves
create an unreasonable risk that prisoners will be unjustifiably deprived of'
their property . 115
Justice Blackmun joined in this concurrence, thus apparently abandoning his previous
opinion that post-deprivation remedies could not satisfy due process in cases involving
intentional deprivations." 6 Justice O'Connor entered a separate concurring opinion,
voicing her view that the prisoner failed to "state a ripe constitutional claim... 117 This
opinion was the first to speak in terms of "exhaustion" for purposes of procedural due
process, a view which has gained some support from commentators. 118
D. Limitations on Parratt and Hudson: The Logan Decision
Parratt and Hudson established the general rule that where a state official tortiously
deprives a person of property, no procedural due process violation occurs absent the
denial of some adequate state remedy. 1 '" This, however, need not always be true. In
1 " This dichotomy has drawn criticism from several commentators as being directly contrary
to the teaching of Home Tel. & Tel, Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). See, e.g.,
Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 11 I 3 (1984); Note, Unauthorized
Conduct of Slate Officials Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer and the Resurrection of
Dead Doctrines, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 843 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Unauthorized Conduct]. The
criticism is much deserved. See also infra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
pis Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534, 535.
113 In drawing this conclusion the Court accepted the lower courts' interpretation of Virginia
law, and also engaged in some discussion of the relevant Virginia cases. Id. at 535-36. In doing so,
the opinion seems to give more force to the argument that the existence of immunity might leave
a state remedy inadequate for purposes of clue process.
114 Id. at 541 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
"5 /d.
ld. at 541 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J.). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 545-46 (1981) (Bl•tekinun, J., concurring).
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 540 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114 At least two commentators share Justice O'Connor's view that exhaustion should be required.
See Travis and Adams, The Supreme Court's Shell Came: The Confusion of Jurisdiction and Substantive
Rights in Section 1983 Litigation, 24 B.C.L. REV. 635, 656 (1983) (arguing that traditional exhaustion
principles should apply); see also Blackmun, supra note 5, at 24 ("Although the Court thus far has
declined to impose a requirement that § 1983 plaintiffs exhaust state remedies, the Court's holding
in Parrott v. Taylor has the potential for doing just that.").
'° There might exist, of course, a violation of some other constitutional right. See infra notes
383-434 and accompanying text.
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Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, the Court refused to extend Parratt to a situation
where "the state system itself .. . destroys a complainant's property interest, by operation
of law .. . ." 12° Thus, where the official acts, tortiously or otherwise, pursuant to some
established state procedure,' 2 ' the Parratt rationale does not apply. This comports with
Justice Steven's concurring remarks in Hudson, 122 and with Parratt's underlying ration-
ale.'" The state could not provide prior process in Parratt or Hudson because the action,
being tortious, was random and unauthorized. In these situations the state could not
predict when a deprivation might occur. Where, however, the act is authorized or taken
pursuant to established procedure, the state theoretically could prevent the deprivation.
In this latter situation, the procedure or authorization itself, rather than the act, violates
procedural due process.'"
E. The Ills of Parratt and Hudson
Parratt and Hudson truly opened a Pandora's Box filled with problematic issues, the
most visible of which concerns the adequacy of state remedies. The Court provided little
guidance in either case concerning what state remedies must include in order to be
adequate. The Parratt Court did make it clear, however, that the state remedies need
not be equivalent to the federal remedies available under section 1983. 125 Thus, states
need not provide for attorney's fees, trial by jury, or punitive damages. 126 Furthermore,
in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982), See infra notes 377-82 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Logan.
121 Defining what constitutes an established state procedure is not always easy. Often, the official
state procedure can differ from the established procedure being followed. For instance, in Grego-1y
v. Town of Pittsfield, the statutorily defined state procedure required that certain process be afforded
prior to a denial of general assistance benefits. 479 A.2d 1304, 1308 (Me. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1018 (1985). The established procedure of the municipality charged with administering the
general assistance plan, however, was not to provide this required process. Id. at 1305. Hence, the
established procedure arguably was unconstitutional, but the state procedure was not. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine found Parratt, not Logan, applicable. Id. at 1308. See supra note 41 and infra
notes 327 and 381.
One commentator argues that because the "concept orestablished procedure' appears identical
to what Monett [v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),] terms 'custom or policy," a
case which falls under Monett necessarily satisfies Logan. Bandes, Mona, Parratt, Daniels and
Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IowA L. REV. 101,
117 (1986). Under this approach a municipal policy, irrespective of its consistency with state law,
would fall under Logan, and Parrall consequently would not apply. Therefore, assuming this position
is correct, Gregory was wrongly decided because a municipal policy existed in that case which,
notwithstanding state law to the contrary, should have fulfilled Logan's established procedure re-
quirement. At least one federal court has agreed with the reasoning of Professor Bandes. In Messick
v. Leavins, an apparently abandoned barge was destroyed without prior notice to the owner, which
was consistent with municipal policy yet contrary to state law. 811 F.2d 1439, 1441 (11th Cir. 1987).
The court found Logan and not Parratt controlling. Id. at 1142. See supra note 41 and infra notes
327 and 333. Contrast Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 199 (6th Cir. 1987)
(concluding a custom or policy could exist without there also being an established procedure).
122 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 541 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See supra note 115
and accompanying text.
23 The Logan opinion had its genesis in the language of Parratt, where the Court noted that a
random and unauthorized act "is not a result of some established state procedure," but instead
occurs "as a result of the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow established state
procedure." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 543 (1981).
149
	 455 U.S. at 436.
125 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544.
126 Id. at 543-44.
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relief granted by the state need not come from the tortfeasor's pocket, but may come
directly from the state's coffers. 127 Beyond these general guidelines, the Court left the
adequacy of any given remedy an open question.
Despite the dearth of guidance given in this area by the Supreme Court, one
principle might be drawn from Parratt and Hudson themselves. In both cases the Court
concluded that the tort victim possessed some remedy, against either the tortfeasor or
the state. In Parratt the prisoner could receive compensation under the state's tort claims
act,' 28 while in Hudson the tortfeasor was personally liable under state law for his inten-
tional acts. 128 Thus, it might be argued that both cases implicitly hold that under state
law it must be possible for either the state or the tortfeasor to compensate the victim. So
long as one or the other is open to liability the remedy is adequate.'"
Not all courts and scholars have accepted this reasoning. While some have argued
that a true remedy in the form of monetary relief must exist to satisfy the requirements
of Parratt and Hudson,''' others have suggested that a simple hearing should suffice,
even if state law or immunity bars recovery.'" As demonstrated below,'" each of these
views presents its own unique problems.
Parratt and Hudson also pose the question whether their rationale, which the Court
expressly applied only to property,'" should extend to life and liberty interests as well.
As might be expected, courts and commentators again have split over this issue.'" It
127 Id.
123 lei. at 543.
In Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535.
i3" The argument also might be made that the Parratt Court did not find that post-deprivation
remedies were necessary, but only that they were sufficient. See Parratt 451 U.S. at 544, discussed
infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 676-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that immunity
defense makes state remedy inadequate) (discussed infra at text accompanying note 184); Labov v.
Laney, 809 F.2d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 1987) (suggesting remedy not adequate if not equivalent to that
found under § 1983); Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Serv., 804 F.2d 1549, 1556
(11th Cir. 1986) (finding remedy); Byrd v. Stewart, 803 F.2d 1168, 1170 (1 Rh Cir. 1986) (finding
remedy), rev'd and remanded, 811 F.2d 554 (1987); McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir.
1986) (finding workers' compensation to provide remedy); Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis.
2d 57, 76-77, 384 N.W.2d 333, 343 (1986) (finding remedy). Cf. Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d
1287, 1129 (5th Cir.) (where § 1983 action is against state court judge, right to appeal is adequate
remedy), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 571-72 (1986). See also Nahmod, Due Process, State Remedies, and
Section 1983, 34 U. RAN. L. REV, 217, 230 (1985) [hereinafter Nahmod, Due Process] ("when all of
the potential defendants are absolutely immune under state law so as that the merits of the plaintiff's
state claim cannot be reached, then the state remedy should be considered inadequate").
132 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding adequate remedy
irrespective of possible immunity), aff'd, 748 F.2d 229, 232 (1984) (en banc) (finding no immunity
and thus not addressing issue), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v. O'Lone,
752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984) (en bane), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Davidson v. Connor, 106 S.
Ct. 668 (1986); Dykes v. •osentann, 776 F.2d 942, 953 (11th Cir. 1985) (Tjollat, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("immunization of judges from suit and the corresponding absence of
a tort remedy for judicial wrongs [does not] provide[] an injured party less process than he is due"),
cert. denied sub nom. Dykes v. Dykes, 107 S. Ct, 569 (1986); Temple v. Marlborough Div. of Dist.
Court Dept, 395 Mass. 117, 128, 479 N.E.2d 137, 143-44 (1985) (mere opportunity for hearing
sufficient irrespective of existence of absolute immunity). Cf Williams v. St. Louis County, 812 F.2d
1079, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no opportunity to be heard, thus refusing to address
question).
133 See infra notes 193-228 and accompanying text.
' 54 See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 536; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543.
0, The split over whether the post-deprivation process rationale should extend beyond property
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was these two concerns that the Court ostensibly set out to address in Daniets 156 and its
companion case, Davidson v. Cannon,'" though the Court never resolved either issue.
11. A NEw BEGINNING: DANIELS AND DAVIDSON
A. The Opinions Below
In Daniels v. Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the
two problems outlined above: first, whether the Parratt -Hudson analysis should encompass
liberty interests, and second, if it does, whether an adequate state remedy exists when it
is reflected in the following cases. Contrast Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11th
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (refusing to extend Paratt-Hudson's post-deprivation process rationale to case
involving intentional infliction of personal injury), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986); Roberts v.
City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 728 (6th Cir. 1985) (Celebrezze, J., concurring) (refusing to extend
Parratt-Hudson's rationale to deprivation of life); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1357 (9th
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (recognizing distinction between property and liberty), cert. denied sub nom.
Cranke v. Haygood, 106 S. Ct. 3333 (1986); Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d
1375, 1379 (10th Cir.) (apparently distinguishing liberty from property), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 131
(1985); Conway v, Village of Mount Kisco, 758 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1985) (Parrott-Hudson's rationale
does not extend to liberty), cert. granted sub nom. Cerbone v. Conway, 106 S. Ct. 878, cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 107 S. Ct. 390 (1986); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1434
(10th Cir. 1984) (same), vacated sub nom. City of Lawton v. Lusby, 106 S. Ct. 40 (1985); cf. Byrd v.
Stewart, 803 F.2d 1168, 1170 (11th Cir. 1986) (notes issue undecided), rev'd and remanded, 811 F.2d
554 (1987); and McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1986) (notes undecided whether
Parratt-Hudson rationale applies to life); with Daniels, 720 F.2d at 795, as amended, 748 F.2d 229 (en
bane) (Parratt-Hudson rationale extends to liberty), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986);
Burch, 804 F.2d at 1554 (finding that life, liberty, and property should all be treated equally); King
v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1986) (extending rationale to liberty); Toney-El v. Franzen,
777 F.2d 1224, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1985) (extending rationale to life and liberty); Hayes v. Vessey,
777 F.2d 1149, 1152 (6th Cir. 1985) (extending rationale to liberty); Young v. City of Killeen, 775
F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985) (extending rationale to life); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584
(6th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (extending rationale to liberty interest); and Temple v, Marlborough Div.
of Dist. Court Dep't., 395 Mass. 117, 479 N.E.2d 137 (1985).
Commentators, including Justice Blackmun, also have argued that the analysis applied in Parrott
and Hudson should be confined to property. See Blackmun, supra note 5, at 24-25; Wells & Eaton,
Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201 (1984); Levinson. Due
Process Challenges to Governmental Actions: The Meaning of Parratt and Hudson, 18 UM LAW. 198
(1986); Moore, Parratt, Liberty and the Devolution of Due Process: A Time for Reflection, 13 W.
REV. 201, 258-59 (1985). Not all commentators have felt this way, however. See Note, Due Process:
Application of the Parratt Doctrine to Random and Unauthorized Deprivations of Life and Liberty, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 902 (1984) [hereinafter Fordham Note] (finding no meaningful distinction
between life, liberty and property).
In addition to distinguishing life and liberty from property for purposes of due process, some
courts have attempted to avoid the Parratt and Hudson holdings by simply limiting them to the
prisoners' rights context. See Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (suggesting
Parrati and Hudson might be so limited); e.g., Wilkerson v. Johnson, 669 F.2d 325, 329 (6th Cir.
1983) (same); 423 So. Salina St. v. City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 485, 503 N.E.2d 63 68 (1986)
(same), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1880 (1987). But see Byrd v. Stewart, 803 F.2d 1168, 1170 (11th Cir.
1986) (refusing to limit Parratt and Hudson holdings in this manner), rev'd and remanded, 811 F.2d
554 (1987).
I" Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
197 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
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appears that both the state and its tortfeasor are immune fibm suit.'" In Daniels an
inmate slipped on a pillow which a deputy-sheriff negligently left on a stairway.' The
inmate brought a civil rights action in federal district court under section 1983, alleging
that he had been deprived of liberty without due process of law."° The original panel
of the court (Daniels 1) held that Parralt extends to liberty interests," and that regardless
of the presence of both sovereign and official immunity, there existed an adequate
remedy for purposes of due process. 142 The court found that this remedy was simply
the right to be heard, and not the right to a recovery) ."
Daniels was considered again by the Fourth Circuit (Daniels 1/)," 4 this time sitting en
bane. In Daniels If the court took a different tack than the original panel, though reaching
the same result. 145 The Daniels II court came to the somewhat startling conclusion that
merely claiming negligence by a state actor does not implicate a "protectable liberty
interest under the due process clause. "146"l'h e court's conclusion was startling because
Parralt apparently held only three years earlier that negligence was enough to implicate
both due process and section 1983.' 47 The Daniels II court, however, read Parralt to apply
only to property, and thus felt free to fashion its own rules regarding liberty.'" As an
alternative holding, the en bane court found that no official immunity was in fact available
for. the deputy-sheriff, and thus found it unnecessary to consider whether the existence
of total immunity might ever give rise to a procedural clue process claim.'"
Daniels II was not alone in its conclusion that simple negligence could not give rise
to a due process violation. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came to the same
conclusion, albeit using different reasoning, in Davidson v. (none.'" There, the en bane
court heard arguments involving prison officials' alleged negligence in failing to protect
an inmate who was attacked and injured by other inmates."' Finding that an inmate
possesses a liberty interest in being free from attack by other prisoners, 152 the court
stated that "nothing in the Court's opinion in Parrall leads us to conclude that the Court
held that merely negligent conduct by state officers constitutes a constitutional depri-
'11 Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2c1 792, 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1983), 748 F.2d 229 (1984) (en banc),
aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
131 ' Daniels, 720 F.2d at 794.
no Id.
in id. at 795.
142 Id. at 798 .
1A5 Id. at 797. See also Davidson v. O'Lonc, 752 F.2d 817, 820 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986) (companion case to Daniels). In Davidson
the court similarly found that despite the existence of total immunity, due process was satisfied.
752 F.2(1 at 830. See also infra note 156 and accompanying text.
114 758 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
''s Id. at 233.
'4r,
	 at 232.
147 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534 (1981).
148
 Daniels II, 748 F.2d at 231.
119 Id. at 232.
752 F.2d 817, 820 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds sub room. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.
Ct. 668 (1986).
151 Davidson, 752 F.2d at 819. The court continuously characterized the case as one involving
simple negligence, although Justice Blackmun later characterized the case as possibly involving
gross negligence. See 106 S. Ct. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
' 52
 Davidson, 752 F.2d at 822.
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vation encompassed by [section] 1983." 1 " Since Parrott was not controlling, the court
concluded that only "intentional conduct, gross negligence or reckless indifference, or
an established state procedure" implicates due process.'" In the alternative, the court
found that even if negligence were enough to support a claim, state law provided an
adequate remedy)" The court firmly rejected the argument that the possibility of
immunity rendered state process inadequate.'" Instead, like the Fourth Circuit in Daniels
/,'" the Third Circuit held that the remedy was adequate even if complete immunity
existed. 155
B. The Supreme Court's Opinions
The Supreme Court surprisingly affirmed the position of the lower courts in both
Daniels II and Davidson, holding simple negligence by state actors insufficient to implicate
due process. 159 In order to reach this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, was forced to reassess and retract his contrary conclusion reached only five
years earlier in Parrott. The majority, however, refused to decide "whether something
less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross negligence,' is enough to
trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." 16°
In support of its conclusion that more than negligence is required to implicate due
process, the Daniels Court engaged in a summary discussion of the due process clause's
purposes.'" Making no effort to distinguish procedure from substance, the Court found
that due process, "like its forebear in the Magna Carta ... was 'intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government . ! "162
 When it
finally acknowledged the distinction between the two, the Court found that procedural
due process promotes fairness in decisions affecting life, liberty or property, while
substantive due process "serves to prevent governmental power from being used for
purposes of oppression," despite the fairness of the government's procedures)65 The
Court, therefore, concluded:
Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure
to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury
caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of
law.'"
The contrary conclusion found in Parrott accordingly was overruled.
," Id. at 826.
' 54 Id. at 828.
''s Id. at 830.
,56 Id.
'"Daniels v. Williams, 748 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) off 'd on other grounds, 106
S. Ct. 662 (1986).
158 Davidson, 752 F.2d at 830.
159 106 S. Ct. at 666.
160 Id. at 667.
16 ' Id. at 665.
162 Id.
' 65 Id.
164 id.
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justice Stevens concurred in the result, but on wholly different grounds.'" In an
opinion which addressed both Daniels and Davidson, he found that the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process guarantee encompasses "three different kinds of constitutional pro-
tection."'" First, the due process clause incorporates several of the specific guarantees
found in the Bill of Rights. 167 Next, it harbors its own substantive guarantee against
certain types of state action. 168 Finally, it guarantees "fair procedure, sometimes referred
to as 'procedural due process' . ."' 69 Finding that Daniels II and Davidson involved only
procedural clue process, Justice Stevens concluded that a tortfeasor's mental state is
irrelevant to a victim's loss:
The harm to a prisoner is the same whether a pillow is left on a stair
negligently, recklessly, or intentionally; so too, the harm resulting to a pris-
oner from an attack is the same whether his request for protection is ignored
negligently, recklessly, or deliberately. In each instance, the prisoner is losing
— being 'deprived' of — an aspect of liberty as the result, in part, of a form
of state action.'"
Based on this reasoning, Justice Stevens determined that a deprivation had occurred
and accordingly turned to the state remedy provided in both Daniels and Davidson.m
Noting that the Daniels II court found that official immunity did not apply, justice Stevens
concluded that the available remedy against the tortfeasor satisfied due process. 172 Turn-
ing next to Davidson where the Third Circuit had found "no state remedy was available
because a New Jersey statute prohibits prisoner recovery from state employees for
injuries inflicted by other prisoners," 1 " Justice Stevens still concluded that due process
was satisfied. Finding nothing objectionable with immunity grants per se, Justice Stevens
concluded that due process was only offended where there is "fundamental unfairness
[in the immunity grant's] operation." 174 Justice Stevens found nothing to "suggest that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity renders a state procedure fundamentally unfair." 05
Thus, Justice Stevens was of the opinion that due process was offended in neither Daniels
II nor Davidson. 170
justice Blackmun concurred in the Daniels resultm but, with Justice Brennan, dis-
sented in Davidson.'" Justice Brennan concluded that "official conduct which causes
personal injury due to recklessness or deliberate indifference, does deprive the victim
16' Id. at 677 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'"6 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
167 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
' 68 Id, at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring).
169 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 680 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1 " Id. (Stevens, J„ concurring).
172 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
177 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring)..
174 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
1 " Id, (Stevens, J., concurring).
170 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
1" Id. at 667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1" Id. at 671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.
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of liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."'" He stated that Davidson
raised a serious question concerning whether the official's conduct was reckless, and thus
he would have remanded the case.' 8° Justice Blackmun also found that "recklessness
must be sufficient" to implicate clue process."' Moreover, he disagreed with the majority's
"inflexible" rule that negligence never offends due process. t 82 Instead, justice Blackmun
opined that "[lin some cases, by any reasonable standard, governmental negligence is an
abuse of power" which should implicate due process. 183 As a final matter, after stating
that Davidson had been deprived of a liberty interest, Justice Blackmun concluded that
the state denied Davidson —an opportunity . .. granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful mariner' ... 'for ral hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,— thus
denying Davidson an adequate remedy. 184
C. Alternatives Presented to the Court
1. Limiting Parrott and Hudson to Property
•
Daniels is not as surprising once one recognizes the magnitude of the problems the
Court faced. In Daniels, the Court essentially was asked to rule upon the constitutionality
of state immunity rules, an area of the law traditionally considered free of any diffi-
culty."5 Of course, the Court did not have to partially overrule Parratt to avoid the
immunity issue. It instead could have chosen to limit Parratt and Hudson to property,
and thus avoided the immunity problem in section 1983 cases involving either life or
liberty.""
The Court understandably did not choose this option. Limiting the Parratt -Hudson
rule to property would be fundamentally inconsistent with the Court's avowed purpose
of deflecting common, everyday torts from the federal forum.'" Had the Court taken
this approach, virtually every negligent injury to person would rise to a constitutional
level. Moreover, limiting Parratt -Hudson to property does not find support in either its
own rationale or the language of the due process clause. Tortious activity is just as
random in relation to life and liberty as it is to property, making it just as impossible for
the state to afford the victim a prior hearing. Moreover, from a semantic viewpoint, the
Constitution places life and liberty on an equal footing with property, all three being
assured due process.
Still, arguments have been made to the contrary,' 88 the most forceful of which is
based in the adequate remedy rationale itself.'" Where property is involved, the argu-
1" Id. at 671 (Brennan,,]., dissenting).
1" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 01 1d. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
185 See infra note 204.
t81' Lower courts have split over this issue. See supra note 135.
187 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
1 ' 8 See supra note 135.
189 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 135, at 258-59:
When an individual has been wrongfully deprived of life or liberty under color of
state law, a post-deprivation remedy may provide some compensation but it does not
provide due process. Once life or liberty is gone, it is gone forever and the deprivation •
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merit goes, the state may .provide an adequate remedy by substituting monetary com-
pensation for the damaged or destroyed item. Where life or liberty is at issue, however,
no amount of monetary compensation can redress the wrong. Because the state could
never adequately remedy loss of life or liberty, the argument continues, a deprivation
of due process occurs commensurate with the tort.
Though this argument is appealing, Hudson completely undermines it. There the
inmate argued that he lost items which were "irreplaceable [sic], and incompensable,"
their having sentimental and intangible value.'" In response, the Chief Justice simply
wrote: "If the .loss is `incompensable,' this is as much so under section 1983 as it would
be under any other remedy." 19 ' The Court thus was not overly concerned that the nature
of the "remedy" in general is monetary. Where property is destroyed, the state cannot
give it back, and monetary compensation will have to do. Similarly, if one is physically
injured or killed, the state cannot take back the pain or bring the person back to life.' 92
Neither can the federal government. Thus, though the argument in favor of distinguish-
ing property from life and liberty is superficially appealing, finding support for such a
position is difficult.
2. Adequacy of State Remedies in Light of Immunity
Had the Daniels Court reached the question of adequate state remedies, in essence
it would have had to rule on the continuing validity of state law immunity. As noted
previously, courts and commentators had split on the issue of whether Parratt and Hudson
actually required some remedy, 1 " or whether recovery could still be adequate if defeated
by immunity. 19" Both the lower courts in Daniels I and Davidson subscribed to the latter
position, finding that the existence of immunity did not affect the adequacy of post-
deprivation process.' 95 But this pro forma approach is difficult to understand in terms of
process being due. As this Article explains below, 1 96 prior process has the advantage of
preventing wrongful deprivations and thus need only take the form of a hearing. Post-
deprivation process, however, lacks this unique characteristic. When post-deprivation
process is required, therefore, it has always taken the form of a remedy, with the purpose
of correcting the wrong that was committed.' 97 Requiring post-deprivation process, but
is complete. Under the Parratt due process analysis, before the deprivation is complete
a hearing must be afforded. When this is impossible, the deprivation is without due
process and the only vindication for the constitutional violation is a section 1983 action.
Id .
468 U.S. at 535:
Id.
102 See Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies, Parratt v.
Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. 11.1.. L. REV, 831,842 ("money is often
the only remedy that an ordered society can provide for victims of governmental misfeasance ....
just as the state cannot be expected to conduct a hearing on whether the reckless squad car driver
should go ahead and run over the pedestrian, the state cannot be expected to provide a hearing in
advance of any statement by a public officer that injures a citizen's reputation. The only due process
the state can possibly provide in such cases is money after the fact."). See also Fordham Note, supra
note 135, at 896.
1115 See supra note 131.
19-1 See supra note 132.
I " See supra notes 142-43,141 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
197 See infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
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allowing this process to simply take the form of a remedyless hearing, relegates the
process requirement to a meaningless gesture.
In contrast, requiring that either the state or the tortfeasor compensate the victim
obviously conflicts with traditional common law. Sovereign immunity historically has
protected the state," whereas the state employee has traditionally received protection
by some form of official immunity. This immunity is either absolute or at least qualified
in the sense that the official is exposed to liability only when she engages in a "ministerial"
as opposed to "discretionary" act. 199 Cases might often arise where the state retains its
immunity shield and the tortfeasor-state employee enjoys some form of immunity. 240
Because no state remedy is available under these circumstances, Parratt and Hudson
arguably would support a federal cause of action. Faced with this realization, the state
would be placed under some pressure to modify its rules regarding sovereign and official
immunity. Though there would be a choice, it would be limited to that of either abro-
gating its state law immunities to some extent, or permitting the federalization of such
claims as a matter of due process. 20 '
In addition, the Parratt-Hudson rule presents an interesting twist to any state im-
munity law challenge. Should the challenge succeed, the Court apparently would not
find the immunity grant unconstitutionah 202
 instead, the immunity, though valid, simply
would trigger a due process violation — the claim would "ripen" in light of the immu-
nity.202 The state or its actor, therefore, would not be liable under state law, but would
be potentially liable under federal law for depriving someone of life, liberty, or property
in the absence of adequate process. Contrast this with the more common scenario where
the Court voids the state procedural rule as being constitutionally infirm. 2" In this
'96
	 Stnolia, supra note 192, at 883 (arguing that Parratt naturally calls into question the
vitality of this principle). See also Nahmod, Due Process, supra note 131, at 230 (same).
199
 See generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 132 (5th ed. 1984).
200 See, e.g., Davidson, 752 F.2d at 830 (sovereign immunity exists and tortfeasor entitled to
qualified immunity); Temple v. Marlborough Div. of Dist. Court Dept, 395 Mass. 117, 479 N.E.2d
137 (1985) (sovereign immunity exists and wrongdoer entitled to absolute immunity).
2° 1
 The possibility also exists that the immunity grant might be deemed unconstitutional, an
approach that might have quite different consequences. See Smolla, supra note 192, at 873; Nahmod,
Due Process, supra note 131, at 230. See infra note 204.
202 But see Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 680-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens suggests that
only those defenses which render procedures "fundamentally unfair" violate the mandates of the
Parratt-Hudson rule. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens does not make his solution
for such violations clear, his approach appears to lean toward voiding the unfair procedure. Thus,
if the procedure is unfair, it should not be used. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203 This appears to be the approach lower courts take when finding the remedy inadequate.
See, e.g., Williams v. St. Louis County, 812 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding remedy
inadequate because of state court's refusal to entertain in forma pauper-is claim); Labov v. Lalley, 809
F.2d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 1987) (suggesting state remedy inadequate if less than that available under
§ 1983).
204
	 e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
374 (1971) (state rule requiring filing fee for divorce proceeding invalidated as applied to indigents).
In Martinez a $ 1983 action was brought by the parents of a girl murdered by a parolee who had
been released only about five months earlier. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 279. Before the Supreme Court,
the parents argued that the officials responsible for the parole decision had deprived the girl of
life without due process of law. Id. at 284-85. The Court disposed of this argument simply by
finding no state action; the parolee was not a state actor, nor did the officials "deprive" the girl of
her life through their action. Id. An alternative argument was also presented before the Court
which reasoned that a state immunity grant which protected the officials under state law was
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situation, no immunity exists and the state or its actor is potentially liable under state
but not federal law. 205 This might seem a distinction without much difference until one
considers the consequences. For example, under the "ripening" approach a cause of
action under section 1983 becomes available with all its benefits."" Under the "voiding"
approach, in contrast, no federal remedy apparently exists under section 1983 because
once the immunity is removed recovery is available under state law."' Strangely enough,
as a federalism matter, the Parratt and Hudson "ripening" approach would appear to be
the more intrusive of the two.208
To complicate matters, assuming some form of remedy is required, procedural and
jurisdictional problems abound. Managing these problems could present a nightmare.
Because the constitutional violation does not ripen until the state fails to provide an
adequate remedy, whatever that might be, a case could conceivably bounce from federal
court to state court and then back to federal court again. 20 Of course, courts may use
abstention or exhaustion principles to alleviate any jurisdictional and procedural
problems, 21 ° but anyone familiar with federal courts recognizes the potential for
unconstitutional because it deprived the parents of property (the wrongful death action) without
due process of law. 1d. at 280-81. The Court stated, "even if one characterizes the immunity defense
as a deprivation the State's interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any
discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizens from
state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational." Id. at 282. Applying a deferential standard of'
review, the Court had "no difficulty in accepting California's conclusion that there 'is a rational
relationship between the state's purposes and the statute.'" 1d. (footnote omitted).
2°5 01 course, there could still be a federal violation under some other constitutional provision.
2°° of the more important benefits of a § 1983 suit is the availability of attorney's fees. See
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982),
20 A state's grant of immunity would he a defense to a state law cause of action. Voiding the
defense, for whatever constitutional reason, acts to remove the defense and leaves the defendant
open to liability under state law. Perhaps an initial action could proceed under § 1983 against the
state, as opposed to the tortfeasor, in an effort to invalidate the immunity defense, cf. Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). But after the invalidation of the defense there would no longer
exist any federal cause of action. Subsequent suits would be brought against the tortfeasor for the
injury inflicted, and not against the state for having an immunity defense. The question of immunity
would then arise, if' at all, as a defense to the state law action, which under the rules of federal
jurisdiction does not convert, the original claim into one "arising under" federal law. See Louisville
& v. Mottley. 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (federal claims must appear on face of well pleaded
complaint and not arise as defense.)
208 One authority suggests that as a practical matter, after the Daniels Court's rejection of
negligence as a valid basis fur a due process claim, immunity is no longer a problem in relation to
procedural due process, because "in most states, the' immunity defense can be invoked as a shield
for negligent conduct, but not for conduct that was reckless or, intentional." Blum, Applying the
Parratt-Hudson Doctrine.. Defining the Scope of the Logan Established State Procedure Exception and
Determining the Adequacy of State Postdeprivation Remedies, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 695, 725 (1986).
Indeed, this is true if the immunity defense available in most states is in fact limited to simple
negligence. This is not overly clear, however, because it seems that immunity dissolves in the face
of malicious conduct, but not necessarily reckless or intentional conduct. See W. KEETON, supra note
199, § 132 at 1062. Also, the defense always exists in relation to. absolute immunity, even in cases
where the action is malicious. See W. KEErox, supra note 199, 132 at 1057. Cf. Temple v. Marl-
borough Div. of' Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass. 117, 479 N.E.2d 137 (1985). Moreover, the defense
of privilege could easily fill any void in that one might be privileged even though not immune. The
question would then be whether the privilege results in an inadequate remedy. See infra note 222.
2119
 See, e.g., infra note 215.
210 See Travis and Adams, supra note 118, at 656 (suggesting that exhaustion principles be
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chaos. 2 ° Consequently, if the Court were to decide some remedy is necessary, it might
be leading itself and the lower federal courts into greater problems than it ever imagined.
Moreover, as an additional complicating factor, preclusion issues could come into
play. 212
 A court often must resolve factual matters in order to assess whether immunity
exists. Presumably, resolving these matters in one court precludes relitigation in an-
other.213 In addition, because state courts must entertain federal civil rights claims, 214
 res
judicata conceivably could present a problem in a subsequent action brought in federal
court. 215
One solution to the various problems raised above might be to require that the
states, as a matter of procedural due process, adopt either the same type of immunity
utilized); Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 CoLum.
L. REV. 979, 982 (1986) (advocating that. Parratt should be viewed simply as abstention doctrine).
2 " See generally Redish, supra note 3, passim; ALI Study 48-50 , 282-87 (quoted in D. CURRIE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 622 (3d ed. 1982)).
212 The Court has found that issue preclusion applies to a § 1983 action if an issue is actually
decided in state court after a full and fair hearing. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980).
This has been extended even to state administrative agencies. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott,
106 S. Ct. 3220, 3226 (1986).
212 A full analysis of claim or issue preclusion in relation to Parratt and Hudson is beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally C. WRIGHT, I'm: LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100A (4th ed, 1983).
For cases involving the Parratt-Hudson rationale and possible claim preclusion, see Alfaro Motors,
Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987) (failure to raise claim in state court could possibly
be res judicata); Punton v. City of Seattle, 805 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1986) (Norris, J., dissenting)
(possible res judicata effect of state remedy on § 1983 action), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1954 (1987);
Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (8th Cir. 1986) (res judicata where
§ 1983 claim raised before state administrative agency).
214
	 generally D. CURRIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS, 208-11 (3d ed. 1982).
2 " For example, suppose a litigant files a § 1983 claim in federal court alleging a violation of
due process for tortious injury to her person. Assume that she does not raise a state law claim
arising under the same tortious conduct. Assume further that the federal court finds an adequate
state remedy under the Parratt-Hudson rationale and dismisses her action for failure to state a claim
under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(6). The hypothetical litigant could then attempt to file in state court,
but it could be argued that she is precluded by res judicata from bringing her action because she
had the opportunity to press her state claim in federal court as a pendant claim under United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). This scenario could be avoided by joining the state claim
with the federal claim in the federal court. See, e.g., Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. If it were then dismissed,
there would appear to be no res judicata effect.
Now consider the reverse situation. Suppose the litigant goes to state court first with her state
claim. She does not join an action under § 1983, hoping to bring such a claim in federal court if
necessary. The state court finds total immunity and dismisses the state law claim. It is possible that
when the litigant goes to federal court she will be barred by res judicata from pressing her § 1983
claim, because She could have joined that claim in the state court action. The argument against this
result is that the federal claim did not arise until the state court ruled in favor of immunity and
thus the federal claim could not have been joined with the state claim in the original action.
Finally, suppose the litigant joins her state claim with a § 1983 action in state court. One
possibility is that the defendant could attempt to remove to federal court, have the 1983 action
dismissed, and then have the state claim remanded to state court. The defendant might then seek
to dismiss the state claim by arguing that it is barred by res judicata in state court, but this tactic
obviously should not succeed. In any event, the litigant would be back in state court where the
federal court's decision in relation to immunity should have some preclusive effect. If her claim
does not succeed in state court, she then might bring an action in federal court, where both res
judicata and issue preclusion could come into play. In that case, the federal district court would
have both its own prior decision to deal with, and that of the state court.
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available in section 1983 actions generally, or some narrower alternative. 216 This narrower
alternative could take the form of either less immunity for the tortfeasor, or perhaps
the creation of a tort claims act that would allow recovery from the state for any injury
whatsoever. If the state adopted the tort claims act method, recovery would always be
available on the state level, and no federal action would ever arise. 217 If the state adopted
the federal immunity standard, where the tortfeasor is immunized in state court he
would also be immune in federal court. A federal cause of action would not be necessary
after the state cause of action because the results would be the same. 218 If by chance the
tortfeasor is found not to be protected by immunity, there is a remedy and no violation
of due process. Consequently, by requiring equivalency between state and federal im-
munities, the procedural and jurisdictional problems suggested above conceivably could
be avoided. 2 ' 9
Although requiring the adoption of a tort claims act appears to present a workable
solution, it is hardly supportable as a matter of constitutional law. States have always
enjoyed sovereign immunity, with little question of its constitutionality. 220 Although
requiring equivalency between immunities might be envisioned as a better solution, this
approach is hopelessly flawed in at least two ways. First, although it might be possible to
equate absolute immunities, 221 drawing any parallel between qualified good faith im-
216 At least two commentators have alluded to this possibility. See Blum, supra note 208, at 725
("where state law establishes an immunity defense that would be available to defendants as a matter
of federal law as well, it would make no sense to suggest that the limitation created by state law
made the state remedy inadequate"). Professor Blum suggests that "[lie problem may be reduced
to the issue of whether the post deprivation process is rendered constitutionally inadequate if the
state law immunity defense is broader than the federal immunity defense." Id. at 726. See also Note,
Parratt v. Taylor Revisited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Requirement, 65 B.U.L. REV. 607, 638 (1985)
("Equal limitations on recovery in each court do not affect the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
However, if state immunity law would bar a claim that would be heard on its merits in federal
court, the adequacy of the state remedy is doubtful.").
217 Under Parma- there would be an adequate state remedy and the due process violation would
never occur. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981).
218 For example, if the action proceeded first in state court and the official were found immune,
any action in federal court would be senseless because immunity from damages would also exist
there. A fundamental problem with this position appears to be that immunity does not negate the
constitutional violation but only protects the defendant from damages. Thus, the argument can be
made that the federal action still exists and there could be a need for declaratory or injunctive
relief, The response to this argument is that no federal action exists to support declaratory or
injunctive relief because due process is satisfied where the state immunity equates with federal
immunity. Although this may be a circular argument it appears to be effective reasoning.
719 This approach appears appealing for the simple reason that it seems awkward to require a
recovery under state law when immunity would preclude recovery under federal law. It thus seems
simple to find that state immunity 'laws should be valid to the extent they do not exceed federal
immunity rules. As demonstrated below, however, though appealing at first glance, drawing such
an equivalency in most situations is neither feasible nor justifiable. See infra notes 220-28 and
accompanying text.
22° See supra note 198 and accompanying text.,
22"
	
1983, absolute immunity is generally available in actions against legislators (Tenney
v, Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)); judges (Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)); and prosecutors
(Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). Absolute immunity is also granted in most states to
legislators, judges and prosecutors. See, e.g., Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982) (prosecutors);
Holland v. Lutz, 194 Kan. 712, 401 P.2d 1015 (1965) (judges). It would thus not appear difficult
to equate the two. See, e.g., Rudow v. City of New York, 822 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding
defendant protected by both state and federal absolute immunity).
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munity under section 1983 and state law qualified immunity could prove difficult if not
impossible. The difficulty lies in the differing natures of the two immunities. State
qualified immunity generally focuses on the capacity in which the state agent was act-
in g.222 Federal good faith immunity, in contrast, focuses on whether a federal right is
clearly established. 223 In the context of Parratt-Hudson, equating the two appears prob-
lematic because the federal right itself, and hence any corresponding immunity, is a
function of the state immunity grant.
Federal good faith immunity exists if the right violated is not clearly established. 224
In the context of cases like Parratt and Hudson, no right exists (and therefore none could
be clearly established) unless the state fails to provide an adequate remedy. The adequacy
of the state remedy, in turn, depends upon the state grant of official immunity. Because
the federal immunity becomes a function of the state immunity — that is, its existence
depends on the existence of state immunity — equating the two in any way appears
beyond the pale of reason. Absent state immunity, no federal right is violated, and thus
no federal immunity issue exists. When state immunity applies, there could be a federal
violation and federal immunity would at least be a possibility. But federal immunity
would turn on whether state immunity was clearly established at the time of the tortious
activity.225 Equating state immunity with federal immunity would require that a court
222 See generally W. KEETON, supra note 199, § 132 at 1059-60 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser and Keeton
define the scope of qualified official immunity as follows:
The qualified immunity is usually destroyed by 'malice,' bad faith or improper purpose,
or in some instances by objectively unreasonable conduct .... It is usually said that
the immunity protects acts within the scope of the officer's duty only if the acts are
"discretionary." This means, more or less, that the acts involve some fairly high level
of policymaking. Acts that do not qualify as "discretionary" acts are usually called
"ministerial," and for purely ministerial acts of executive officers or employees there
• is no immunity.
Id.
In contrast, see Blum, supra note 208, at 725. Professor Blum argues that the Daniels decision
which held that negligence cannot support a claim under § 1983 effectively has nullified any problem
concerning immunities because immunity generally is not available in the case of an intentional or
reckless act. Cases can be imagined, however, where the injury inflicted is intentional or the result
of gross negligence, yet is performed in good faith, without malice. Some form of qualified immunity
could exist in such a situation. Moreover, absolute immunity exists even in the face of malicious
conduct. See W. KEETON, supra note 199, § 132 at 1057. Thus the Daniels decision relieves no strain
in this regard. Even if immunity does not exist, however, there may well exist some justification of
excuse for the conduct, even if intentional, and thus the defendant would be "privileged." See W.
KEETON, supra note 199, § 16 at 109-10. The vacuum created by the Daniels decision in relation to
immunity could simply be filled by privilege. See supra note 208. Note that because privilege generally
takes the form of excuse or justification, it is necessarily intertwined with whether the deprivation
is "correct." See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text. Therefore, any challenge to a state's
grant of privilege under the Pairait-Hudson rationale is simply an attack on the substance of state
law, even to a greater extent than an attack on immunity.
223 See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) ("A plaintiff who seeks damages for
violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified im-
munity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at
issue."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("government officials performing discre-
tionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known"); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
224 See supra note 223.
225 Because the existence of the federal right necessarily turns on the existence of state immu-
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determine whether the tortleasor should have known he was immune in order to
establish whether he is immunc1 226 Even more bizarre, if the state immunity is not clearly
established there is then federal immunity. Because there is equality between the two,
state immunity is also available. But this necessarily means that state immunity is only
available if it is riot clearly established in the first place!!
Second, even if the Court could achieve equivalency between the two types of
immunity, the fact remains that federal immunity is not of constitutional dimension. 227
Indeed, it is a simple judicially created device designed to protect government officials
from harassment, and to ensure that they can perform their functions without fear of
personal liability. 228 The permissible scope of state immunity grants under the Parratt-
Hudson analysis, in contrast, is a constitutional question. No justification exists for ex-
tending a judicially created federal immunity grant to the states as a matter of consti-
tutional law. The only justification imaginable is convenience — a poor excuse for
constitutional jurisprudence.
D. Critical Analysis of Daniels and Davidson
Once one recognizes that the Court faced a difficult immunity problem in Daniels
and Davidson it is easy to understand why it embarked on its due process analysis. But
understanding is not agreement. Although the simplicity of Daniels is appealing, and for
the most part the decision appears to achieve the Court's desired end of preventing
section 1983 from becoming a "font of tort law, "229 the fact remains that the Daniels
nity, the question of whether a clearly established right existed would further require determining
whether a clearly established immunity existed.
226 If the slate immunity were clearly established. then the tortleasor should have known of it
and should have known of the federal right; thus there would be no federal immunity. If state and
federal immunities are equated, then the issue again becomes whether the state immunity was
clearly established.
227 See generally Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 745-47 (1982) (immunity in relation to
§ 1983 action question of policy and congressional intent).
229 See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984) ("The qualified immunity doctrine recognizes
that officials can act without fear of harrassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate when
their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly
terminated."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982),
229 See suprenote 12. The Daniels decision has proven quite effective in fleecing the federal
courts of § 1983 claims predicated on due process. See, e.g., Ortega v. Rowe, 796 F.2d 765 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1887 (1987); Strandburg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.
1986); General Elec. Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1987) (petition for cert. filed June
9, 1987); Chesney v, Hill, 813 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1987); Ketchum v. County of Alameda, 811 F.2d
1243 (9th Cir. 1987); Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct, 3184
(1987); Rascon v. liardiman, 803 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986); Bowie v. Procunier, 808 F.2d 1 142 (5th
Cir. 1987); Jones v. City of Chicago, 787 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1986); Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d
1325 (7th Cir. 1986); Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1 147 (8th Cir. 1986); Escamilla
v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Barker, 799 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.
1986); Rodriguez-Mora v. Baker, 792 F.2d 1524 (I I th Cir. 1986); Maddox v. City of Los Angeles,
792 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986); McKenna v. City of Memphis, 785 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1986); Partridge
v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston, 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986); Walker v. Rowe, 791
F.2d 507 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 597 (1986); Dunster v. Metropolitan Dade County, 791
F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986); McIntyre v. Portee, 784 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1986); Love v. King, 784
F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1986); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 815 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1987) (opinion vacated
and reargued); Lopez v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 817 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1987). State courts
too have gotten into the act. See, e.g., Stalnaker v. Boeing Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1291, 231 Cal.
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holding is both unnecessary2" and bad constitutional law. As a constitutional matter,
Daniels is disturbing because it reflects the Court's willingness to forego constitutional
theory in an effort to achieve what it perceives to be a desirous result. In Daniels the
Court gave no real reason for its conclusion that due process requires more than simple
negligence. Instead, the Court spoke merely of abuses of power and fundamental fair-
ness, never convincingly explaining why negligence could not be an abuse, or why it
could not be unfair. 2" Justice Powell provided the only true analysis in his Parratt
concurring opinion when he attempted to draw a connection between equal protection,
the eighth amendment, and procedural due process. 2" Equal protection and the eighth
amendment require something more than negligence, he argued, and so should proce-
dural due process. 2"
Justice Powell's analysis is flawed because it assumes that procedural and substantive
guarantees are of like character. The reasons for requiring process, however, differ
markedly from the concerns that support mens rea requirements under the equal pro-
tection clause and the eighth amendment. In relation to equal protection and eighth
amendment challenges, the Court is generally concerned only where the state makes a
conscious choice, as opposed to merely causing a result which is a consequence of some
other aim. 2" In the latter situation the political process presumably can rectify any
unintended consequence, because it was not the intent of the legislative body to achieve
that result?" In the former situation, because the legislature intended the result, there
is less chance of change in the political forum. Hence, the Court is justifiably more
suspicious, and more willing to allow change through adjudication. When examining
Rptr. 323 (1986); Crowder v. Correctional Medical Sys., 497 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1986); McDonough
v. Jorda, 214 N.J. Super. 338, 519 A.2d 874 (App. Div. 1986); Appleton v. Town of Hudson, 397
Mass. 812, 494 N.E.2d 10 (1986); Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review
dismissed, 492 So. 2d 1333 (1986).
Some courts, however, appear to have gone overboard, applying Daniels to constitutionally
protected rights other than due process. See, e.g., Lunde v. Oldi, 808 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1986) (right
to vote); Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364 (fourth amendment); McDonough v. Jorda,
214 N.J. Super. 338, 519 A.2d 874 (App. Div. 1986) (fourth amendment). Other courts have
recognized, however, that the Daniels holding is confined, for the time being, to due process. See,
e.g., Lahov v. Laney, 809 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1987) (Daniels holding does not apply to first amendment);
liberal v. University of Colorado, 713 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1986) (same).
"" See supra notes 370-82 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. See Daniels, 106 S. Cc at 673 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
2'2 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 547 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
°°3 1d. (Powell, J., concurring). See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (holding
deliberate indifference sufficient to constitute an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment). See also Whitley v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1086 (1986)
(wantonness or willingness that harm occur necessary for eighth amendment violation); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that before strict scrutiny is applied in a case involving
equal protection, there must be purposeful discrimination).
2" This Article does not purport to support or challenge the Court's adoption of a mens rea
requirement in relation to equal protection. For an analysis of both sides of the problem, see
Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 36 (1977). See also Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Cr. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
2" Because no intent to cause the discriminatory result exists, no reason exists to "cleanse" the
political process by invalidating the law. See Eisenberg, supra note 234, at 116.
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equal protection claims, for example, the Court requires purposeful discrimination
because the Court is only suspicious of intentional governmental decisions that tend to
burden a suspect class. Where the discrimination is unintentional, the Court is not as
concerned and applies a lower level, deferential standard of review."8 Similarly, when
addressing eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims, the Court only
becomes concerned where the purpose of the harm can be characterized as punishment
— something either intended or at a minimum indifferently allowed." If the state's aim
is not punishment there is less need for judicial supervision, because the resultant harm
is not intentional.
Of course, this description simplifies the reasons supporting mens rea requirements
in constitutional adjudication."8 But one thing is clear; mens rea is deemed relevant
because normative choices are being made. Procedural due process, however, does not
involve substantive choices. Procedural due process does not impede substantive deci-
sions. Because substantive decisions are not being scrutinized, there is no reason to be
concerned with whether the decision was intentional, reckless, or negligent. There is no
varying level of scrutiny when speaking simply of process in its literal sense. Indeed, in
terms of pure process nothing raises or dispels suspicions, because process is merely a
mechanism for making decisions and not an ultimate choice. The question simply focuses
on when and how much, with the goal of minimizing the risk of substantive error. 239
In relation to substantive due process, on the other hand, the argument in favor of
requiring some level of runs rea is much stronger. A definite analogy exists between
substantive due process and equal protection because both involve substantive decisions.
But the analogy is stretched too far when the Court states that as a threshold matter
more than mere negligence is required even to implicate due process. 24° No such re-
quirement exists for equal protection, as the Court has always afforded classifications of
any sort at least rationality review. 241 Equal protection applies in such a case, but it is
routinely satisfied. The Daniels Court went beyond this rationality requirement when it
held that negligence does not implicate due process. 242
2S6
	 note that one does not lose equal protection for lack of demonstrating purposeful
discrimination. Equal protection still applies, the question being one only of scrutiny. See Rogers v.
Lodge, 958 U.S. 613, 617 n.5 (1982).
vo Whitley v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1086 (1986); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
See supra note 233.
4S8
	 generally J. NOWAK, R. RoruNnA & J. Youxo, supra note 54, at 547-48. In essence, by
requiring a certain level of mens rea, the Court is searching for a workable method of allocating
decision-making authority. This is a recurrent theme throughout constitutional law, with roots that
reach back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). As a benchmark for deciding
when to leave resolution of certain problems to the political forum, this approach might work.
When speaking of process, however, which in no way deals with substantive choices, it makes no
sense to speak in terms of allocating decision-making authority; indeed, the states are free to make
whatever decisions they wish, Procedural due process only requires they first consider all the facts.
22  In contrast, see Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct, 662, 680 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part) ("The harm ... is the same whether [the injury is inflicted] negligently, recklessly, or inten-
tionally .... In each instance, the prisoner is losing — being 'deprived' of — an aspect of liberty
as the result, in part, of a form of state action.").
24° See Daniels, 106 U.S. at 665.
241 Sec supra note 236..
242 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665. Thus, requiring more than mere negligence in order to give rise
to a procedural due process action is wholly unsupportable, while there is support for the same
requirement in relation to substantive due process. See infra notes 422-24 and accompanying text.
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It is possible that as a linguistic matter the Court could be correct in finding that
more than negligence is required under the fourteenth amendment; at least an argument
exists in support of this conclusion. In Parrott, Justice Powell cited Webster's Dictionary
to support his conclusion that "[a] deprivation connotes an intentional act denying
something to someone, or, at the very least, a deliberate decision not to act to prevent a
loss." 245 But something more is needed than reference to a modern dictionary to justify
such an "interpretivistic" approach. This Article submits that without strong support for
what meaning the Framers intended to ascribe to the word "deprive" in the fourteenth
amendment, the Court should hesitate to attach any definitive meaning. Where consti-
tutional language is at best ambiguous, the more prudent course is to look for reasons
supporting the preference of one mental state over another. Where no supporting
rationale exists, the Court should simply make no choice.
E. Daniels and Municipal Liability
Aside from being bad constitutional law, Daniels and Davidson also raise serious
questions regarding municipal or institutional liability. Under Monet! v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 244 before a municipality may be held liable under section
1983 for its agents' actions, at a minimum the plaintiff must show that some municipal
"custom or policy" caused the injury. For a due process violation to exist, Daniels now
requires that the plaintiff show that more than mere negligence by the state actor caused
the injury. The question thus arises whether the Court intended to extend Daniels to
municipalities as an additional requirement for liability, or whether all that the plaintiff
need establish is the actor's underlying violation along with the predicate causally related
custom or policy. Put another way, the question is whether the plaintiff must prove that
the municipality possessed culpability beyond mere negligence in formulating the policy
which caused the deprivation to occur. 245
But see Comment, Civil Rights — 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — The Actionability of a Negligent Deprivation of a
Liberty Interest in Light of Daniels and Davidson, 69 MART. L. Rev. 599, 632 (1986) (agreeing with
the Daniels decision to the extent it applies to procedural due process).
243
 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). A perpetual debate
concerning the Court's ability to interject its own political and moral values into the Constitution
has spawned two distinct schools of thought: one labeled "interpretivism," the other "noninterpre-
tivism." The "interpretivistic" approach looks for the true meaning of the Framers. Thus, the
common meaning of words used in the text of the Constitution and its various amendments is a
useful tool under this approach. Those who abide by noninterpretivism, however, are more willing
to recognize the changing values of society in attempting to give meaning to the Constitution.
Contract M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) and Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); with Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972) and Monaghan, supra note 46.
244 Monett, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978) (municipality cannot be held responsible on respondeat
superior basis, but must cause constitutional violation). See also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S.
Ct. 129'2, 1298 (1986); Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985).
245
 The Court has yet to answer whether there exists any culpability requirement beyond that
inherently created by the Monett decision. In Tuttle, a case involving an alleged policy of inadequate
training of police officers, the Court left this question open. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.7. See also
City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1115 (1987) (per curiam) (dismissing, as improvidently
granted, certiorari over question "whether more than negligence in training is required in order to
establish such liability"). Four Justices dissented from the dismissal of certiorari in Kibbe and would
have ruled that more than negligence is required for institutional liability where the policy is one
of inadequate training. Id. at 1116 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Consider the scenario where a police officer intentionally injures someone in person
or property during the course of an arrest. Because it is intentional the police officer's
conduct satisfies the requirements of Daniels, thus raising a colorable procedural due
process claim (and probably also a fourth amendment claim). 246 Now assume the munic-
ipality employing this officer failed to train him or her in any way whatsoever. The
plaintiff might also sue the municipality under section 1983 on the grounds that the
municipality's failure to train the officer amounted to a policy or custom which caused
the constitutional violation. 247 The question now begged by Daniels is whether municipal
liability requires either gross negligence or intent on the part of the municipality in
depriving the individual of life, liberty, or property through its policy or custom, or
whether some lesser degree of culpability is sufficient to establish such liability.
Under nearly identical facts to those posed in the above hypothetical, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 248 required not only a
custom or policy, but also gross negligence before an institution 249 might be held liable
24" In Tuttle, a police officer intentionally shot a suspect to death, and subsequently a § 1983
suit was brought against the officer and the municipality that employed him. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
In relation to the underlying constitutional violation, which was not at issue before the Court, the
plurality noted:
The facts of this case are, of course, very similar to the facts of Tennessee v. Garner ....
We note that this Court has never held that every instance of use of' "unreasonable
force" in effecting an arrest constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment; nor has
this Court held under circumstances such as these that there has been a deprivation
of life "without clue process of' law."
Id. at 817 n.4 (citations omitted).
"7 Suits of this nature have become quite common. See Annot., Liability of Supervisory Officials
and Governmental Fntilies for Having Failed to Adequately Train, Supervise, or Control Individual Peace
Officers Who Violate Plaintiff's Civil Rights Under 42 USCS § 1983, 70 A.L.R. FED. 17 (1984) (collecting
cases).
1148 806 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987)
(superimposing the Daniels holding on that of the Monell decision); Jones v. City of Chicago, 787
F.2d 200, 203 (7th Cir. 1986) ("it now appears that at least as to certain constitutional deprivations
[such as Daniels] the plaintiff may have to present proof of fault beyond mere negligence on the
part of the City in establishing the policy or tolerating the custom"); Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821
F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1987) (superimposing the Daniels holding on that of the Monell decision); Hogan
v. City of Houston, 819 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1987) (apparently doing the same).
245 The court in Bergquist repeatedly alluded to the liability of the officers' supervisors under
the Monet! decision, as opposed to the liability of the institution, the county. Apparently, though it
is not overly clear from the opinion, the action was brought against the county for its failure to
train adequately its police force, See 806 F,2d at 1369. Thus, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit
addressed supervisors' liability under Monell for inadequate training, it presumably addressed such
liability in their respective official capacities. An official-capacity suit, of course, is actually one
against the institution. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469
U.S. 464 (1985).
To the extent that the Bergquist decision might be read as involving a personal-capacity suit it
is questionable whether the Monett holding is even controlling. See, e.g., Languirand v. Hayden, 717
F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing personal- from official-capacity suits), cert. denied sub nom.
Languirand v. City of Pass Christian, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984). But see Annot., supra note 247, at 28-
36 (cases apparently failing to make distinction). The Monell decision struck a balance in favor of
limited institutional liability, but did not address personal liability. Before supervisors or other
policymakers can be held personally liable, a strong argument exists for the position that each
individual must be found to have violated the Constitution. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)
(refusing to allow injunctive relief against supervisors for allegedly unconstitutional acts of agents);
DeFeliciano v. Roque, No. 86.1300, slip op, (1st Cir. Aug. 14, 1987) ('supervisory officials may be
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for the unconstitutional acts of its agent. In that case, although the policy of inadequate
training satisfied ManeIl, 25° the institution was not liable unless it had been at least grossly
negligent, relative to the deprivation, in maintaining such a policy. 23 ' According to the
Ninth Circuit, Daniels applies both to the agent and the institution.252 Now, the suggestion
that municipal liability should not attach absent gross negligence is not in itself nove1, 253
but the manner in which the Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion is. 254 If other courts
follow the Bergquist lead, Daniels could greatly narrow institutional liability, especially in
the context of inadequate training. 255
Bergquist is a difficult case to justify, most significantly because the court failed to
recognize that a constitutional violation occurred which was indeed the result of an
intentional act. 256 The Bergquist court disregarded this fact, and instead required not
found liable only on the basis of their own acts or ommissions"); Wilson v. City of North Little
Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 322 (8th Cir. 1986) ("A cause of action predicated on such a theory [of
supervisor liability) may be maintained only if [the supervisor] demonstrated deliberate indifference
or tacit authorization of the offensive acts by failing to take remedial steps following notice of a
pattern of such acts by his subordinates.") (relying in part on Rizzo); Languirand, 717 F.2d at 220.
Thus, Bergquist may be justified as a personal-capacity case even though it cannot be justified when
characterized as an official-capacity case. See infra notes 250-64 and accompanying text.
2" The Supreme Court has never decided whether inadequate training can satisfy the "custom
or policy" requirement of Monett See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.7. Contrast Oliver, Municipal Liability
for Police Misconduct Under 42 § 1983 After City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 64 WASH. U.L.Q.
151 (1986) (arguing inadequate training amounts to "custom or policy"). In Tuttle, the Court dealt
only with whether a jury could infer a municipal custom or policy from a single incident of police
misconduct. The Court held that although the single incident is in fact evidence of a custom or
policy, it cannot by itself support the conclusion that a custom or policy exists. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at
814. But see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986) (single incident on part of
policymakers enough to support finding of policy or custom).
251 Bergquist, 806 F.2d at 1370.
252 Id .
2" Several pre-Daniels opinions found that something more than mere negligence was required
on the part of a municipality before inadequate training might rise to the level of' a "custom or
policy" sufficient to find liability under Monett. In fact, this was probably the majority view even
before the Daniels decision. See, e.g., Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983). See
generally Annot., supra note 247 (collecting cases). At least one circuit, in contrast, has read the
Parratt decision as expressly authorizing actions against municipalities based solely upon negligence.
See Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brandon v. Holt,
469 U.S. 464 (1985). These cases were involved in interpreting § 1983, however, and did not
purport to make rules of constitutional dimension. See also Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1114 (Court dismissed
certiorari over question whether mere negligence sufficient in case involving inadequate training);
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.7.
Bergquist, 806 F.2d at 1370.
255
 As an initial matter, the claim in Bergquist centered around a purported unlawful search,
thus involving the fourth amendment. Id. at 1366-67. The court, however, relied on the Daniels
decision to hold that mere negligence was not enough to support a fourth amendment claim. Id.
at 1370. Because Daniels was a due process case, however, and not one involving the fourth
amendment, the Bergquist court apparently erred in its reliance on the Daniels decision.
256
 The claim alleging a cause of action under § 1983 charged that certain members of the
Cochise County Sheriff's Office, together with several federal Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agents, illegally searched plaintiff's farm. Id. at 1366-67. The claim thus involved intentional
conduct on the part of the officers and not simple negligence. It is worth noting at this point that
the logic of the Daniels decision has been extended to the fifth amendment's due process clause.
• See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1987) (extending Daniels to
federal government); Stalnaker v. Boeing Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1291, 231 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1986)
(same).
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only a constitutional violation by the agent, but an additional independent constitutional
violation by the institution. 257 This approach is difficult to square with Monell, which
rejected the doctrine of respondeat superior in relation to institutional liability under section
1983 and held merely that some causal link must exist between an institutional policy or
custom and the underlying constitutional violation. 258 Mandl never suggested that the
institution must independently violate the constitution; rather, it found that the agent's
conduct becomes the institution's when some causal link exists. 259
Following Daniels, a due process violation occurs only when two factors are present:
first, an injury to life, liberty, or property without due process, and second, the requisite
mental state. 26" Under Monell, it would appear that once the plaintiff establishes the
causal connection between the custom or policy and the constitutional violation, the
violation is attributed to the institution. 2"' This necessarily includes both the injury
257 Bergquist, 806 F.2d at 1370.
258
	 supra note 244.
2" See subra note 244.
26°
	
Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 663 (1986). A similar problem exists in relation to
equal protection, because a constitutional violation occurs only where there exists discriminatory
effect together with a purpose to discriminate. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Therefore,
in relation to institutional liability, the question is whether the institution must possess discriminatory
purpose, or whether a simple custom or policy causing discrimination on the part of an agent, who
possesses purpose, is sufficient. It is submitted that the latter of the two approaches is the correct
one, although the lower courts do not make this overly clear. For example, in Wilson v. City of North
Little Rock, the court strongly suggested that in order to be liable for racial discrimination a
municipality must independently possess discriminatory purpose. 801 F,2d 316, 324 (8th Cir. 1986).
The same is true of the court in Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 760-61 (5th Cir.
1986). The above cases might be distinguished from an inadequate training case in that in both of
these cases the court was looking for a custom or policy causing the violation on the part of the
respective municipality, yet could not identify one. Consequently, it could be argued that the Wilson
and Jett decisions merely reflect attempts and failures to isolate the "final authority" responsible for
the violation. See also Webb v. City of Chester, 813 F,2d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1987) (policymaker is
one making discriminatory decision and thus there is no difficulty finding municipal liability). See
generally Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monett Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65
N.C.L. REV. 517 (1987).
251 City of Los Angeles v Heller, which was decided in the same term as Daniels, can be read to
support this view. 106 S. Ct. 1571 (1986). In Heller, a charge was brought against certain police
officers under § 1983, the underlying constitutional violation resting on the use of excessive force
during an arrest. Id. at 1572. A claim was also made against the City of Los Angeles under Monett,
the argument being that the municipality authorized the officers' conduct. Id, at 1572-73. The
district court held a bifurcated trial, with the action against the individual police officers proceeding
first to the jury. Id. at 1572. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officers, the
district court dismissed the action against the municipality, concluding that without an underlying
constitutional violation there could be no municipal liability. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the case against the munic-
ipality should have gone to trial because the jury theoretically could have found a constitutional
violation on the part of the police officers, yet still held in their favor due to the existence of good
faith immunity. 759 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court reversed in a per euriam decision.
106 S. Ct. 1571 (1986). The Court first pointed out that no instruction was given on good faith
immunity and thus the jury could not have used this as the basis for its judgment. Id, at 1573.
Instead, the jury necessarily must have found an absence of any constitutional violation. Id. Next,
the Court concluded that where no constitutional violation by an agent exists, there can be no
municipal liability, even if a municipal policy exists which authorizes the violation., Id.
The Heller Court consequently appears to favor some form of derivative liability; there must
be a violation by the agent for the principal to be liable. Although this is not strict vicarious liability,
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without due process and the agent's mental state. Bergquist deviates from Daniels by
attributing only the injury to the institution, but not the mental state. 262
 This bifurcated
approach to institutional liability is internally inconsistent, because if an institution can
only act through its agents, it can only think through them, too. 263 Charging one but not
the other to the institution creates a strange dichotomy indeed, one that the Court could
not have intended in Daniels 2 09
Moreover, mixing Monet! and Daniels is like, to use an old cliche, mixing apples and
oranges. Monetl presupposes the municipal agent's constitutional violation and focuses
on institutional responsibility under section 1983. Daniels, in contrast, focuses on the
constitutional violation only. Thus, Monell is simply a remedial decision under section
1983, while Daniels involves the question of whether a constitutional violation actually
occured. Any requirement that a plaintiff prove a municipality independently culpable
should be made in the context of section 1983, like Monet!, and not in the constitutional
context, as in Daniels. In this way, any intent requirement will be the result of statutory
interpretation, not constitutional law.
Daniels appears to provide a tidy solution to a sticky constitutional problem. In
reality, however, Daniels is questionable law with little or no theoretical or precedential
support. Daniels' only support flows from the fact that it acts to limit the flow of cases
into federal court. But this is simply administrative convenience and not sound consti-
tutional reasoning. Moreover, Daniels may not be as antiseptic as it first appears, and it
does not provide a comprehensive guide to procedural due process. Indeed, the decision
creates problems. It leaves wholly unresolved the issue of what constitutes sufficient post-
deprivation process in cases of intentional or grossly negligent conduct. Most importantly,
as this Article demonstrates below, Daniels is unnecessary for the simple reason that both
Parrott and Hudson are flawed. It was the result generated by the earlier two cases that
created a need for the Daniels decision, and once the Parrott and Hudson reasoning is
corrected, Daniels may be dispensed with.
III. RECONSIDERATION OF PARRATT AND HUDSON
A. The Problem With State Action
Federalizing common law torts involving state officials implicates more than just the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The concept of state action is equally
neither is it a requirement that the municipality independently violate the Constitution. Rather, the
Monett Court's approach to municipal liability seems to fall in between the two extremes, and the
Heller decision suggests that the Court favors the derivative liability side of the spectrum.
262
 Bergquist, 806 F.2d at 1370.
26' See Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MIcti. L. REV. 225,250-51
(1986) (pointing out that an institution only possesses a mental state through its agents). Professor
Whitman engages in an excellent discussion of municipal responsibility for the constitutional vio-
lations of its agents. This Article does not purport to offer any opinion on whether some indepen-
dent mental state should he required of institutions in general prior to extending liability. All that
is suggested is that the Daniels decision does not impose such a requirement. See supra note 253;
infra note 264.
2" There definitely exists enough controversy within the Court concerning the meaning of
Monell without Daniels. See, e.g., Pernbaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986); City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
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important. 265 Because a state only acts through its agents, when courts address the
constitutionality of a state's conduct the focus often turns instead to the agent's action.
When the state authorizes this action courts have little difficulty in equating the agent's
actions with those of the state. 2"" To use the previous illustration, if state law requires
the destruction of homes built prior to 1900, and omits any requirement for prior
process, the law as written violates procedural due process. Similarly, if' an agent acts
pursuant to this law it is not difficult to understand that his conduct, because the state
authorized it, violates due process.
But imputing an agent's unauthorized, or perhaps even illegal, conduct to the state
is not so easily explained. Despite this difficulty, the Court held in Home Telephone &
Telegraph that for state action purposes, unauthorized conduct should be imputed to the
state.267 Accordingly, even if state law fully comports with due process, where the state
agent acts without providing process, a constitutional violation occurs.
The Court in Parratt and Hudson, although it spoke in terms of due process, altered
Home Telephone & .Telegraph's rationale. In Parrall, the Court held that although the
official's unauthorized action is ascribed to the state, no constitutional violation occurs
until the state fails to redress the wrong through its tort claims act. 2" The Court thus
viewed state action from two planes: through the official in relation to the deprivation,
and through the state in relation to the denial of process. But at a minimum, Home.
Telephone & Telegraph stands for the proposition that in assessing the constitutionality of
a state actor's conduct, that conduct must be judged independently of state law. 269 Parra ll
26J
	 supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
256 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Young made possible the exercise of federal juris-
diction to restrain a state official front violating the Constitution. The argument was made in Young
that the eleventh amendment divests federal courts of jurisdiction in cases where the state is a
party. Id. at 149. The Young Court rejected this argument, however, finding that federal jurisdiction
is not barred where the named party is not the state, but a state official. Id. at 159. Therefore, the
fiction now exists that although a state official's conduct is state action for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, it is not for purposes of the eleventh. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 1, at § 4231.
20 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v, City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). Not long before Home
Tel. & Tel., the Court apparently reached the opposite conclusion: that unauthorized action could
not be attributed to the state. See Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904). Though Home
Tel. & Tel. did not expressly overrule Barney, the Court finally laid Barney to rest in United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS '290 n.20 (4th ed.
1983).
268 See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
269 In Note, Unauthorized Conduct, supra note 111, at 843, the author asserts that Home Tel. &
Tel. stands for the proposition that "as a matter of constitutional law, a claim is perfected for the
purposes of lower federal court adjudication under the fourteenth amendment as soon as the
particular state officer or state agency engages in the alleged harm." Id. The author further argues
that the Hudson decision "strayts]" from this doctrine of "constitutional perfection." Id. Taken to its
illogical extreme, the Parrott decision conceivably could compeledy wipe away the doctrine of Home
Tel, & Tel. For example, in Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Sem, thi: plaintiff had been
involuntarily committed to a state mental hospital without a prior hearing. He brought suit under
§ 1983 claiming that he had been deprived of procedural due process. 804 F.2d 1549,1551 (1 hh
Cir. 1986), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 812 F,2d 1339 (1987). Plaintiff's committal without a
hearing, however, was wholly contrary to state law; for this -reason the court found that procedural
due process did not require a prior hearing. 804 F,2d at 1556-57. The court stated: .
The state has designed its laws to ensure that. a person would not be wrongly deprived
of his liberty .... In light of these facts, we cannot see how Florida could predict that
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therefore deviated from this rationale by allowing state law to correct the agent's
conduct. 27 °
Although Parratt's departure from Home Telephone & Telegraph is subtle, Hudson's is
flagrant. Not only is Hudson inconsistent with Home . Telephone & Telegraph because it
allows state law to correct its agent's wrongs, but it also rejects the very underpinnings
of Home Telephone & Telegraph by only imputing part of the agent's conduct to the state."'
In Hudson the agent intentionally destroyed the prisoner's property; 272 thus there clearly
existed an opportunity to provide prior process. 273 The Hudson Court dismissed this fact
as irrelevant, and instead focused on whether the state could possibly provide prior
process. 274
 Consequently, the Hudson Court was willing to impute only an agent's action
to the state but not his inaction — that is, the failure to provide a hearing. Home Telephone
in Burch's case its employees ... would ignore the State's command. Thus, as in Parrott
and Hudson, this case does not present a situation where the state could establish any
type of predeprivation hearing, beyond that provided by the statutory commitment
procedures, to protect Burch from random and unauthorized acts.
Id. This rationale is only one step removed from requiring state approval of the agent's actions
befOre imputing the conduct back to the state, something the Home Tel. & Tel. Court expressly
refused to do. 227 U.S. at 285. See also Temple v. Marlborough Div. of Dist. Court Dept, 395 Mass.
117, 479 N.E.2d 137 (1985) (same analysis); supra note 41.
2" Professor Monaghan vehemently criticizes the Parma opinion as being inconsistent with that
of Home Tel. & Tel. for slightly different reasons, stating:
Parratt's asymmetric treatment of different kinds of official conduct cannot be ade-
quately rationalized in state action terms. No distinction can turn on the adequacy of
state corrective process, because that factor can be held constant in all situations.
More fundamentally, as a means for determining the time when a constitutional
violation occurs, Parratt's state action theory is in direct conflict with principles thought
to be settled by Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles .... Under Home
Telephone, the fourteenth amendment reaches any executive or administrative conduct
that contravenes the fourteenth amendment .... [lit makes no difference whether
the state official is using or misusing state power. Under Home Telephone, the consti-
tutionally offensive state action occurs at the point at which the state official acts.
Isilonaghan, supra note 210, at 994-96. Professor Monaghan concludes that:
Parratt is ultimately grounded in a theory of "state action" that cannot be reconciled
with the more general constitutional understanding contained in Home Telephone and
Monroe. Moreover, Parrott has consequences that arguably are beyond the power of
Congress to alter. These results are unfortunate and unnecessary. Either the remaining
aspects of Parma should be overruled, or the decision should be recast.
Id. at 982.
See also K. Davis, supra note 75, § 26.10 at 416 ("the technique [used in Parratt] ... could
possibly cut back the § 1983 cases by ninety percent"); Note, Unauthorized Deprivations of Property
Under Color of Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Due Process Analysis in Parratt v. Taylor, and a
Proposed Alternative Analysis, 36 RuicrtRS L. REV. 179, 215-16 (1983-1984) [hereinafter Note, Un-
authorized Deprivations]; Note, Unauthorized Conduct, supra note 111 at 837-51.
271 See Rubin, supra note 111, at 1113. Professor Rubin concludes that although the result in
Parrott is correct, the Court used an "unjustifiable route" in reaching its conclusion. Id. In contrast,
Professor Rubin argues that because the Court in Hudson failed to recognize that the state actor, as
opposed to the state, violated due process by not granting a prior hearing, its result is "simply
wrong." Id. See also Note, Unauthorized Conduct, supra note 111, at 860-61 (suggesting that although
the Parrott decision might be squared with that of Home Tel. & Tel., the Hudson decision cannot).
272 1-ludson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984).
2" See Rubin, supra note 111,  at 1113; Note, Unauthorized Conduct, supra note 1 I I, at 860.
274 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. See supra notes 1 10-1 1 and accompanying text.
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& Telegraph, however, requires attributing an agent's conduct to the state whether it is
active or passive, at least when the agent "proceed[s] upon the assumption of the
possession of state power ...." 75
Whether Home Telephone & Telegraph reflects "good" or "bad" constitutional law is
not the issue. Of relevance here is that the Court in either Parratt or Hudson could have
achieved its goal of preventing due process from becoming a font of tort law by over-
ruling Home Telephone & Telegraph. The debate then would focus on the desirability of
that result in terms of state action, and not in terms of due process. The Court in Parratt
and Hudson, however, did not overrule Home Telephone & Telegraph, but only skewed its
application. Unauthorized conduct still is attributable to the state, only now the state has
the opportunity to correct it. Moreover, in Hudson the Court indicated that only affir-
mative conduct that causes injury is charged to the state; passive conduct, such as failing
to provide process, is not. State action, therefore, is distorted under the Patron Court's
decision, because the state is awarded time to correct its agent's error, and also under
the Hudson decision, because the Court chooses what portion of the agent's conduct to
impute to the state. This bending of state action theory in turn leads to problems with
due process, for this methodology fails' to achieve the goal of defederalizing common
law torts. Instead, it merely postpones the constitutional question.
B. The Problem With Due Process
Commentators have almost uniformly criticized the Court's approach in both Parrott
and Hudson, not only for its inconsistency with Home Telephone & Telegraph, 27° but also
for its apparent dilution of due process. 2" Few, if any, critics suggest, however, that the
Court might have in fact expanded constitutional protections under Parrott and Hudson
instead of retracting them.278 Indeed, most commentators have assumed the worst of
276
 Home Tel. & Tel., 227 U.S. at 288. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 27{).
277 See Wells & Eaton, supra note 135, at 215 (criticizing Parrott opinion for failing "to articulate
whether the holding is a ruling in procedural due process or substantive due process or both" as
well as generally criticizing the decision fur wiping away constitutional rights); Rubin, supra note
I 1 I (arguing that although the Parratt decision might be correct, the Hudson decision is categorically
wrong); Travis & Adams, supra note 118 (the Parrott Court confuses substance with jurisdiction);
Friedman, supra note 75 (the Parrott decision could "undermine the basis for most section 1983
cases brought in federal court"); Note, Unauthorized Conduct, supra note 111; Fordham Note, supra
note 135; Note, Unauthorized Deprivations, supra note 270; Comment, Federalism, Section 1983 and
State Law Remedies, supra note 82, at 1037. See also Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction
Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 Gm. L.J. 861 (1982); Levinson, supra note 135;
Nahmod, Due Process, supra note 122; Moore, supra note 135, at 258-59 ("When an individual has
been wrongfully deprived of life or liberty under color of state law, a postdeprivation remedy may
provide some compensation but it does not provide due process.").
278 That the Parrott and Hudson decisions might invalidate many states' immunity rules has been
recognized by several commentators. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 192, at 873; Nahmod, Due Process,
supra note 131, at 230. In addition, several commentators have found the post-deprivation process
analysis proffered by the Court in Parratt and Hudson to be somewhat curious and perhaps even
wrong. See Redish, supra note 211, at 100-01 (criticizing Parma decision for confusing substance
and procedure); Rubin, supra note 271, at 111-12 (arguing challenge in Parratt was substantive as
opposed to procedural since plaintiff "did not allege a deprivation of due process rights, and thus
[the case was properly dismissed because plaintiff] failed to state a federal cause of action"); Smulla,
supra note 192, at 876-77 (recognizing that Parrott holding interferes with the states' ability to
define property, but praising this result because it provides an "'emergency override' ... that makes
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Parratt and Hudson, concluding that they work to unravel constitutional protections. 278
But this Article argues that the most unsettling result of Pan-au and Hudson is not their
dilution of constitutional rights, but rather, their creation of new rights.
Courts and commentators generally have read Parratt to stand for the proposition
that due process is not offended by a negligent deprivation of property where the state
provides an adequate remedy.28° According to this interpretation, Parrott requires post-
deprivation process. And Hudson solidified this rule, as the Court there expressly stated
that Parma established the principle that "the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated
when a state employee negligently deprives an individual of property, provided that the
state makes available a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. "281
That this interpretation of Parratt was correct, however, is not so clear. In Parratt,
the Court concluded that no due process violation had occurred because the plaintiff
never contended that the state's procedures were "inadequate," or that prior process
was "practicable." 282 In addition, the Parrott Court noted that a remedy did exist under
state law for the tortious loss of property and this, the Court found, was "sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of due process." 2" Parrait, therefore, can be read to stand for
two propositions. First, where prior process is neither practicable nor challenged as
inadequate, procedural due process is not at issue. Second, where the state provides a
remedy for its tortious invasion of property rights, this is sufficient to satisfy due process.
The argument therefore exists that Pan-att's discussion of post-deprivation remedies was
merely an alternative holding in the case and not the linchpin of the decision. Moreover,
even if post-deprivation remedies were crucial to the decision, the Court determined
that the state remedies were merely sufficient, and not necessary to satisfy due process. 284
In any case, Pan-au currently is accepted as standing for the proposition that when
a state agent negligently deprives someone of property, due process is not offended so
long as the state provides an adequate remedy. Pan-all's error, however, lies in its re-
the decision an eminently practical compromise in federal-state allocations of power"). See also
Whitman, supra note 263, at 268.
279 See supra note 277.
299 See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
2" Hudson, 468 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). A majority of the Court
joined this opinion.
282
	 U.S. at 543.
283 Id. at 544.
284 Not all of the justices in Parrati interpreted the majority's opinion in this manner. Justice
Stewart apparently believed post-deprivation process was in fact a necessity. He stated in his
concurring opinion:
But even if Nebraska has deprived the respondent of his property in the constitutional
sense, it has not deprived him of it without due process of law. By making available
to the respondent a reparations remedy, Nebraska has done all that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires in this context. On this understanding, I join the opinion of the
Court.
Id. at 545 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Justice Blackmun also apparently read the majority opinion to require a remedy. Id. at 545-
46 (Blackmun, j., concurring). See also id. at 547 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). Finally, Justice
Marshall in dissent found the remedy to be inadequate, resulting in a due process violation. He
thus would have required a remedy to satisfy due process. See id. at 554-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting
in part) (finding that although the Tort Claims Act was adequate, an inadequacy existed because
inmate never informed of its availability). For this reason, to the extent that the Court's opinion
might be interpreted as not requiring a remedy, it is only a plurality opinion.
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quiring a remedy in situations where the state simply cannot provide prior process. To
the contrary, when no practicable way exists for either the state or its actor to provide
predeprivation process in the form of notice or a hearing, and consequently no claim
can be made that prior process is somehow inadequate, the conclusion must be that no
procedural due process violation exists irrespective of the availability of some post-
deprivation remedy. 2"
Parratt invoked the Mathews balancing approach in an effort to postpone process.
But under Mathews the problem is one of timing — the court must decide whether
process should come before or after the deprivation. 2 " 6 Mathews presupposes the possi-
bility of prior process and merely permits its delay in light of overriding state interests.
The situation exemplified by Parrati, however, is fundamentally different: In Parratt the
deprivation resulted from negligence, and thus the actor had no opportunity to provide
prior process. Similarly, the state itself could not furnish process prior to the loss because
the actor's conduct was entirely random and unauthorized. 287 Parratt therefore diverges
from Mathews in that it does not focus on timing or postponing process, but instead
requires process in the first instance. This requirement, rather than simply minimizing
the risk of erroneous substantive decisions, which is the keystone of process, 285 actually
creates substantive rights.
Property only has a legal existence as a result of remedies prescribed by the state. 2"
As justice Holmes stated:
[P]ot' legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy — the
imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be
285 See infra notes 286-310 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 70 and accompanying text. The general rule is that there must be process
prior to the deprivation.
257
	
argument has been made that the state could provide process in the form of prophylactic
measures in such a case. As demonstrated below, this would merely be the imposition of substantive
duties, and thus cannot be explained as process. See infra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
Viti I n Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1978), the Court articulated this principle by
stating:
Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation,
but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property .... Such
rules minimize substantially unfair or mistaken deprivations of life, liberty, or property
by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them
of protected interests.
Id. Even when used in the context of "minimum contacts," see, e.g., Asian Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (before a forum may exercise personal jurisdiction certain
minimum contacts must exist); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (same); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (same); international Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (same); or basic "fairness," see, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976) (tribunal must be fair); Johnson v. Mississippi, 40'3 U.S. 212 (1971) (judge must be
unbiased); the Court has basically been concerned with minimizing the risks of an incorrect decision.
See also Withrow v. Larkin, 921 U.S. 35 (1975) (fairness extends to quasi-judicial agencies).
2" See Stnolht, supra note 192, at 846 ("Since the early writing of Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
modern legal mind has grown accustomed to the recognition that even the most traditional forms
of property — real estate and chattels — have legal existence only because of the prediction that
the force of the state will be brought to bear upon those who seek to interfere with them."). See
also Monaghan, supra note 210, at 986 n.58 ("both the nature of the substantive duties imposed on
state officials by the fourteenth amendment and the extent to which the state must provide remedies
for their violation are matters of substantive due process").
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brought to bear upon those who do things to contravene it — just as we talk
of the force of gravitation accounting for the conduct of bodies in space 2 9°
By dictating that a state provide an adequate remedy where it has interfered with
property, the Court is granting a greater property interest than initially created by the
state. Such a position is inconsistent with the Court's traditional position that the four-
teenth amendment itself does not define property. 29 ' Even in relation to "liberty," which
the fourteenth amendment does at times define, 292 the Court is engaged in defining
substantive guarantees rather than procedural ones.
The argument exists, of course, that if Parrall's post-deprivation process defines
substantive rights, then so does Mathews and all other Supreme Court cases which use
post-deprivation process, because those cases also require a remedy. But in every Su-
preme Court post-deprivation process opinion before Parrott, the state could have af-
forded prior process.29s Under these circumstances a remedy does not define substantive
rights, but merely serves as a proxy for the result that would have obtained had the
plaintiff received prior process. 294
When the Court has required process prior to a deprivation, it has at most required
that the state provide a hearing, the purpose of which is to protect against a mistaken
deprivation as opposed to the deprivation itself. 295 There exists no guarantee that a
hearing will prevent a deprivation; rather, the assumption is that if the state is made
aware of the merits it will not erroneously deprive someone of life, liberty, or property.
Thus, so long as the state complies with the hearing requirement, whether a deprivation
actually occurs does not affect procedural due process. 2"
Allowing process to follow the deprivation, however, requires alteration of this
principle. No longer is a simple hearing sufficient, but instead there must be a remedy. 297
This is so because of the substitute nature of post-deprivation process. Prior process is
preferred and thus forms the rule 2 99 In light of certain state interests, however, process
after-the-fact is sometimes sufficient. For process after-the-fact to achieve the same results
as prior process, and thus justify its substitute status, correction of any error is required.
There must be a remedy.
29" Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV, L. Rev. 40,42 (1918). See also Smolla, supra note 192, at 846
n.67.
29 ' See supra note 63. Generally, states define property. The Congress may also create property
rights and when it does so, the Court looks to the Congress as it would look to the state legislatures.
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
292 See supra note 292.
29' See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (paddling of public school pupil).
294 See infra notes 295-305 and accompanying,text.
295 See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,259 (1978). See also supra note 288. When speaking
of a "mistaken" deprivation, the Court means a deprivation inconsistent with the substantive rule
being applied. Substance in relation to property is determined by state law, while in relation to
liberty it is defined by both state and federal law. See supra note 63. Life appears inherently self-
defined, although it might receive a broader, or perhaps even narrower, interpretation. See supra
note 63. For further analysis dealing with the application of substantive rules and mistaken results,
see infra notes 317 and 367.
296 It might, however, be a substantive due process concern, or some other substantive right.
See infra notes 383-434 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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In the classical procedural due process case, for example, there are two distinct
injuries: first, the injury in being denied prior process, and second, the substantive
wrong, if any. 299 As the Court made clear in Carey v. Piph•,"9 the absence of process in
and of itself generally causes no damage, 904 rather the damage results from an "incorrect"
substantive decision. The substantive wrong -- the incorrect decision — flows from the
procedural wrong, however, and thus to compensate the plaintiff fully for the procedural
violation, the substantive violation must also be redressed." 2 Had the state provided
prior process it presumably would not have made an incorrect decision; hence, "but for"
the procedural error the substantive wrong would not have occurred. Therefore, as a
matter of full compensation for damage done, the substantive error must be redressed.
To achieve equivalency with this result, process after-the-fact must take the form of
a remedy because, as above, the substantive wrong must be corrected. Therefore, where
the Court simply permits the state to postpone process it could have provided before
the deprivation, the remedy requirement does not define the substantive limits of life,
liberty, or property, but only substitutes for the result that would have obtained had
there been prior process. In essence, the Court has told the state to apply its own
substantive rules, whatever they might be, after the fact."' The same cannot be said of
Parratt. In that situation, the remedy required cannot act as a proxy for prior process
for the simple reason prior process was impossible. Instead of instructing the state to
apply its own substantive rules after the fact, Parralt, irrespective of state tort law,
demands that the state correct what the Court presumes to be an "error."394 The remedy
in such a case, therefore, does not insure the proper application of state substantive
rules, but instead acts as a substantive rule that mandates that a state agent not injure
another in person or property.905
2" See Carey v. Piplius, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
w° Id. In Carey the Court found a constitutional violation due to the omission of process prior
to the deprivation. The deprivation, however, was "correct" in that it was justified by state law. Id,
at 261. Thus, because there was only a procedural wrong and not a substantive wrong, the Court
found only an award of nominal damages to be justified. Id. at 266-67.
901 Even where there exists only a procedural violation, damages for mental and emotional
distress are still a possibility. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 260. Moreover, punitive damages might be
obtained in an appropriate case. Id. at 257 n.1 I. Punitive  damages cannot be recovered, however,
from a municipality. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). The Court recently
reaffirmed Carey in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, finding that a jury cannot award
damages based on its perception of the "importance" of the rights violated. 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986).
The Court found that "the abstract value of constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983
damages." Id. at 2544.
9U2 See Carey, 435 U.S. at 261.
303 See supra notes 295 and 284.
Generally, the substance of the interest is defined by the state. See supra note 295; infra notes
317 and 367. Thus, whether the deprivation amounts to an "error" most be determined by state
substantive law and remedied accordingly. The Parratt rationale goes beyond this by demanding
correction without allowing state law to determine whether there has been an error in the first
instance.
"3 In contrast, Professor liandes states:
Traditional procedural due process analysis focuses on whether a constitutionally
adequate hearing was provided before a permanent deprivation of property occurred.
It is questionable whether Parratt fits this mold. It has been argued that Taylor's
complaint in that case was not that his property was taken without a hearing, but that
it was taken at all. Once characterized as a complaint about process, it was inevitable
that Taylor's claim would be rejected. It is conceptually absurd to expect a hearing
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The suggestion has been made that process includes more than simply notice and
an opportunity to be heard," 6
 and thus, even under the circumstances of ParraIt, it has
been argued, prior process was possible. Specifically, the argument is that "process"
might include prophylactic measures, such as training police officers to avoid the use of
excessive force, or taking steps to minimize the risk of injury to inmates."' If this
argument prevails, however, procedural due process would be converted into a species
of tort law. Process would thus become indistinguishable from substance, as this argument
essentially urges recognizing a duty by the state to avoid substantive harm. ," This Article
submits that procedural due process was never intended to manufacture substantive
rights. Instead, procedural due process finds logic only when it acts as a tool to minimize
factual error.m Toward this end, "process" simply requires "notice and hearing," albeit
in flexible form.")
The Parrall Court's error thus lies in the fact that it looked for state remedies even
after it concluded that process prior to the deprivation was impossible. After finding it
impossible to afford prior process, the Court should have dismissed the procedural due
process claim. If predeprivation process cannot be afforded, it makes no sense to require
that it must. In turn, it likewise is nonsensical to postpone process, thereby requiring a
remedy, when no prior process could have been afforded in the first place.
Hudson, in contrast, presented a different state of affairs. Some form of prior process
was possible in Hudson, if not from the state's perspective, then from the actor's."' The
before a negligent and unpredictable loss of property. The state's willingness to com-
pensate was all he could reasonably demand.
Bandes, supra note 121, at 138 (footnotes omitted).
906 See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 263, al 267-68:
1he fact that a loss is not deliberate does not mean that no predeprivation steps are
available to government actors. Where the risk of loss is foreseeable and sufficiently
high, due process may be said to require that steps be taken to minimize that risk.
Though the loss of the property in a situation like Parrott is not intended, the failure
to provide these safeguards might itself be either deliberate or inadvertant, depending
on whether the risk had been explicitly focused upon in the design of the institutional
structure. The Court in Parralt did not address that question, perhaps because it
assumed that 'process' referred to the sort of safeguards, such as hearings, that might
surround individuated decisions made in particular cases. It thought, therefore, only
of what could be done for Taylor, and after-the-fact compensation scented enough.
Id. See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 517, 546 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("When it is
possible for a State to institute procedures to contain and direct the intentional actions of its officials,
it should be required, as a matter of due process, to do so.").
907 See Bandes, supra note 121, at 138-40 (suggesting "process" might consist of more than
notice and hearing, but could also include training); Whitman, supra note 263, at 273 (suggesting
"process" might include more than "procedures (that) are designed to minimize factual error in
government decisionmaking"); Comment, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 144,
149 (1986) (arguing in favor of prophylactic measures).
3°8 See Monaghan, supra note 210, at 986 n.58.
309 See supra notes 288 and 295. This is what the due process "explosion" was all about. See
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). But see Note, Unauthorized
Deprivations, supra note 270, at 212 (arguing that in tort context due process concern must shift
from minimization of factual error to minimization of deprivations).
310 See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (discussing flexible nature
of procedural due process).
911 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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tortfeasor in Hudson intended his action,312 and thus conceivably could have stopped to
first afford a hearing. Notwithstanding the Court's contrary conclusion, 313
 the torifeasor's
failure to afford prior process must be imputed to the state under the rationale of Home
Telephone & Telegraph. 311 That prior process is possible, however, does not ipso facto
implicate due process. The other precondition to procedural due process is that there
must be a reason for having it — a reason supporting the requirement of prior process.
When speaking in terms of procedural due process, the Court has made it clear that
it is speaking of the process necessary to minimize the risk of an erroneous deprivation. 3 15
In a case like Hudson, however, risk of error is simply not at issue. The plaintiff's claim
is not that a procedural safeguard could have prevented the injury, but that the injury,
with or without process, should not have occurred.' 6 Because the destructive conduct
in Hudson was unauthorized, the state could not "justify" the injury. 5" Where the state
cannot justify the conduct, facts are not in dispute, and there is no reason for notice or
a hearing; there is no reason for process. 3 1 8 The purpose of process is to insure that the
state acts in a "correct," or justifiable, substantive manner. In Hudson nothing could
justify the state's action in destroying the property. The plaintiff did not challenge the
lack of process, but the substance of the action. When no factual dispute exists, therefore,
there is no reason for prior process and, consequently, procedural due process is not
truly at issue.sm
At first blush this might seem quite strange. Where facts are disputed, that is, where
the state might have a good reason for its action, a procedural due process violation
conceivably occurs when the state does not provide process. When no justification exists
for the state's action, however, no violation occurs. Thus, the more egregious conduct
appears to be left unremedied. But this is not necessarily true. Generally, state law
provides some remedy when the state actor's conduct is completely unjustifiable. Im-
munity, the predominant impediment. to recovery, is unnecessary in these cases because
immunity primarily tempers the advantage hindsight may offer and thereby avoids
discouraging state officials from exercising their judgment. Where no reason for the
312 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,519-20 (1984).
3" Id. at 532.
3" See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
315 See supra text accompanying note 295.
"'See supra notes 278 and 305.
317 Whether action is 'justified" is determined by the same substantive law that creates the
interest at issue. 11 - an act is justifiable, it necessarily is "correct." In the case of property, because
state law generally creates the interest, state law must be analyzed to determine whether conduct
interfering with the interest is justified. Life and liberty, in contrast, find their foundation not only
in state tort law, but also in the Constitution. For example, one generally has a liberty interest in
being free from the infliction of any appreciable physical pain. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977), discussed supra in notes 72-74 and accompanying text. Therefore, substantive
constitutional law must be considered along with state justification principles where life and liberty
interests are involved in determining whether the conduct is 'justified." Because of the generally
deferential nature of substantive constitutional law in this regard, however, the decision inevitably
focuses on the state rules. See infra note 367.
318 For instance, in Codd v. Velger, the Court noted that "if the hearing mandated by the Due
Process Clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must be some factual dispute . . . ." 429 U.S. 624,
627 (1977) (emphasis added).
312 But this does not mean that such conduct is constitutional. There could very well be either
a substantive due process violation, or a violation of sonic or other constitutional right. See infra
notes 383-4.34 and accompanying text.
860	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:813
actor's conduct exists, however, there is little room for judgment. Hindsight can thus be
more prudently applied in this situation, without fear of discouraging future proper
conduct. 32° Due process in its procedural sense is only needed in those situations where
there might be some reason supporting the action, for only in those situations does the
danger exist that an "incorrect" deprivation might occur and yet go unremedied. 321
Immunity has forceful application to these cases and because of this guard against
hindsight, the foresight of procedural due process is needed.
In addition, it must be remembered that the conduct may violate substantive due
process or some other constitutional right. 322 Thus, it is not so clear that the more
egregious conduct lacks a remedy. Even if the more egregious injury were to go unre-
medied, however, this Article submits that this is not the fault of constitutional jurispru-
dence. Due process is not an absolute guarantor of correct governmental action. Instead,
procedural due process seeks to minimize the risk of incorrect decisions, 523 while sub-
stantive due process seeks deferentially to avoid irrational activity. 324 If certain conduct
by the state falls between these guarantees, which it inevitably will, then society should
attempt to correct the injustice. Due process should not be the panacea for society's
failures. 323
C. A Proposed Alternative Analysis
Once it is clear that the Parratt-Hudson analysis went too far in requiring a remedy,
the next step is to determine how the cases should have been resolved in terms of
procedural due process. This Article submits that when neither the state nor its actor
320 In cases where no reason justifies a constitutional deprivation, any immunity which might
protect the tortfeasor should dissolve. Where there is no justification for the conduct at issue, the
conduct generally will be bordering on the malicious. When this is true there generally exists no
immunity. See W. KEETON, supra note 199, 132 at 1059-60. Moreover, because the conduct is in
no way justifiable, by definition, it cannot be privileged. Privileged conduct is that which is justified
or excused; the assumption here is that it is neither. See W. KEETON, supra note 199, § 16 at 108-
10. The suggestion that Daniels may have done away with the immunity problem in relation to the
Parrott-Hudson rationale can be distinguished. Daniels only bars claims based on negligence. Im-
munity could thus still arise between the extremes of negligence and malice. In addition, privilege
could also be a factor in such cases. See supra note 222.
" 1 Where there is a possible justification for the action, the possibility of immunity is much
greater. The state is generally more willing to allow for immunity in such a situation because it does
not want to deter its official from making a decision that might be justifiable. See generally W.
KEETON, supra note 199, § 132 at 1065. Moreover, a privilege on the part of the tortfeasor could
also defeat recovery. Id., § 16 at 108-10.
322 See infra notes 383-434 and accompanying text.
323 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra notes 410-14 and accompanying text.
325 Consider in this regard the perceptive thoughts of Gram Gilmore:
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a society. A reasonably
just society will reflect its values in a reasonably just law. The better the society, the
less law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law and the lion will lie down with
the lamb. An unjust society will reflect its values in an unjust law. The worse the
society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due
process will meticulously observe.
Gilmbre, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022, 1044 (1975). In contrast, see
Monaghan, supra note 46, at 427 (arguing that the Paul decision makes no sense because "the more
reprehensible and subject to legal redress the conduct, the freer the state is to engage in it").
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has the opportunity to provide prior process, as in Parrott, nor has reason to provide
process, as in Hudson,326 procedural due process is not implicated. In other words, before
procedural due process should be considered there must exist both an opportunity for
prior process and a reason for affording process. Therefore, if the state were to pass a
law requiring the destruction of all homes built before the year 1900, but provided no
mechanism for prior process, the issue of procedural due process would be raised. The
state would have the opportunity to require prior process, and a definite reason for such
process would exist. Similarly, even if state law did require a hearing and a state agent
inadvertantly omitted the hearing and intentionally destroyed a home she believed was
built before 1900, procedural due process would again be at issue. 327 Under this variation
the agent possessed the opportunity to provide prior process and a reason, determining
the vintage of the home, existed for having it.
Even when both an opportunity and a reason for prior process exist, however, it
does not mean that such process must in fact be afforded. Once this threshold deter-
mination is made, the next questions are whether, what, and when the process should
be required. First, in some situations governmental interests might justify dispensing
with process altogether. 328 In addition, procedural due process is a flexible concept which
can vary between simple notice and a full-fledged hearing. 523 Finally, the timing of the
process must be considered; post-deprivation process might also suffice. 330 But before
reaching these issues, procedural due process first must be implicated. This threshold
question is satisfied only if there is an opportunity and reason for prior process.
The Parratt Court itself arguably adopted a similar position, as demonstrated
above."' Moreover, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressly recognized analogous
528 Of course, because there was no opportunity for process in Parratt there also was no reason
for it, Therefore, the question of opportunity is subsumed by the question of reason. This Article,
however, will keep the issues separate so as to better analyze Parratt and Hudson.
521 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). In Logan, state law mandated
a hearing, yet the hearing was "inadvertent[ly]" omitted, Id. at 426. Still, the Court found a due
process ,violation. Contrast Messick v. Leavins, 811 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir. 1987) (failure to abide by
state law requiring process still due process violation); with Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental
Health Serv., Inc. (11th Cir. 1986) (failure to abide by state law requiring hearing deemed unau-
thorized, thus making the Parrott Court's requirement of post-deprivation process applicable): and
Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304 (Me. 1984) (same).
528 This author does not wish to speculate on what type of governmental interest might justify
such a result, but it is at least conceivable. See e.g., Albers v. Whitley, 546 F. Supp. 726,732 n.1 (D.
Or. 1982), 743 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986); Monaghan, supra note 46,
at 431 ("Due process might mean no process, at least no formal adversary process.").
See Friendly, supra note 310.
558 See .tup-ra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text. Professor Monaghan also espoused a similar
position in relation to the Court's holding in Paul v. Davis. Professor Monaghan argued that Paul
took too narrow a view of the term "liberty." Monaghan, supra note 46, at 430-31. Instead, he
argued, the Court could have found liberty to include the right to be free from defamation, yet
still achieved its desired result by simply finding process unnecessary:
Prior hearings might well be dispensed with in many circumstances in which the state's
conduct, if not adequately justified, would constitute a common-law tort. This would
leave the injured plaintiff in precisely the same posture as a common-law plaintiff,
and this procedural consequence would be quite harmonious with the substantive view
that the fourteenth amendment encompasses the same liberties as those protected by
the common law.
Id. at 431 (footnote omitted).
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reasoning in McClary v. O'Hare, 352 a case involving.the death of a county highway de-
partment employee. In McClary, the employee's widow/administratrix brought a section
1983 suit which alleged that his accidental death denied the decedent procedural due
process.'" The Second Circuit, struggling with Parratt's logic, took a tortured path before
eventually concluding that no procedural due process claim existed." The court's rea-
soning was based in part on the assumption that Parratt did not apply to an interest in
life,33 ' and therefore did not require post-deprivation remedies in the case at bar. The
McClary court explained:
It is difficult for us to see what sort of process the State should or could have
provided the deceased. Procedural due process requires that certain proce-
dures be followed before (or under Parratt after) the State can properly take
life, liberty, or property. Appellant does not claim that any procedures the
State could have followed would have made the accidental, even if recklessly
caused, deprivation of her husband's life proper. Appellant complains that
state actors caused her husband's death, not that in doing so they failed
somehow to apply the proper procedures. Procedural due process is simply not
implicated in this case at all. 396
As an alternative holding the court, assuming Parratt applied to an interest in life, found
that adequate state remedies were available to the plaintiff.'" In reaching this conclusion
the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Logan exception should apply."'
Again struggling to determine how procedural due process was even relevant to the
case, the Court stated: "In those cases finding that a deprivation occurred as a result of
an established state procedure ... predeprivation process was possib/e." 339 Consequently,
because the decedent's injury was completely accidental (or random) and unauthorized,
prior process was impossible; neither the tortfeasors nor the state could have provided
it. 3 4 0
 For this reason the court dismissed the plaintiff's procedural due process claim."L
Undoubtedly, the Second Circuit's conclusion in McClary is correct. Procedural due
process was not implicated there for either of two simple reasons: first, no opportunity
for process existed prior to the decedent's injury because of its accidental nature, 342 and
second, even if there were an opportunity for prior process the plaintiff's claim was that
the death should not have occurred at all, not that the state made an erroneous deci-
sion."' Because facts were not in dispute, no reason existed for providing process.
Consequently, without an opportunity or a reason for prior process, procedural due
process could not be violated.
"2 786 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1986).
3" Id. at 89-85.
2" Id. at 87.
"5 Id.
16 Id. (emphasis added).
337 Id. at 88.
335 Id. at 87. If Logan were applied, the case would fall out of the post-deprivation remedy
analysis. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
339 Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
"° Id.
341 Id. at 87-88.
312 /d. at 87.
343 Id. at 87-88.
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The Supreme Court continues to struggle with its post-deprivation process analysis
even after Daniels, and in doing so demonstrates its own uncertainty regarding the
soundness of the Parratt-Hudson rationale. In Whitley v. Albers, decided shortly after
Daniels, a prisoner, shot in the leg during an uprising, brought a section 1983 action for
violations of his eighth and fourteenth amendment rights.'" The prisoner made both
substantives'" and procedural due process claims under the fourteenth amendment."'
Though it evidently reached the merits of the procedural due process claim, the Court
simply stated that 'Nile District Court was correct in ruling that respondent did not
assert a procedural due process claim that the State was obliged to afford him some kind
of hearing either before or after he was shot." 347 The district court dismissed the pro-
cedural challenge (on the merits) for two separate reasons."' First, the court found no
liberty interest at stake. 549 Second, the court concluded that even if a protected liberty
interest existed,
in the midst of the emergency created by riotous inmates holding a guard
hostage, the Constitution simply does not mandate a due process hearing
for each inmate potentially affected by remedial action. When prison au-
thorities are reacting to emergency situations in an effort to preserve the
safety and integrity of the institution, the state's interest in decisive action
clearly outweighs the inmates' interest in a prior procedural safeguard.'"
While it is not clear which of the two reasons the Supreme Court felt was correct, the
Court's reliance on the second conclusion appears more plausible."' There can be no
serious dispute that the inmate had a protected liberty interest." 2 The fact that any
person, whether an inmate, pre-trial detainee, or law professor, has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in being free from bodily harm is virtually unassailable." The
district court's reasoning to the contrary is unconvincing." Thus, it appears likely the
Court found that the district court's alternative conclusion was essentially correct.
544 100 S. Ct. 1078, 1083 (1986).
345 In relation to the substantive due process claim the Court deferred to the eighth amendment,
finding due process at best protected the prisoner only to the same extent as did the eighth
amendment. Id. at 1088. The Court found that an eighth amendment claim existed only where the
state actor exhibited wanton or willful wrongdoing. Id. at 1085. See infra notes 408-14 and accom-
panying text.
34o 106 S. Ct, at 1088.
547 Id. (emphasis in original).
345 See Whitley v. Albers, 546 F. Supp. 726, 732 n.1 (D. Or. 1962).
$49 Id. This conclusion is curious indeed, since courts uniformly have recognized a liberty interest
in being free from bodily harm. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
55° Whitley, 546 F. Supp, at 732 n.1 (citations omitted).
851 Whitley, 106 S. Ct. 1088.
352 See infra note 353.
553 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (student has liberty interest in being
free from any "appreciable physical pain" inflicted by school authorities). See also Davidson v.
Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 672-73 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is well established that this
liberty includes freedom from unjustified intrusions on personal security."); id. at 680 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("the interest in freedom from bodily harm surely qualifies as an interest in liberty'").
3s4 The district court's opinion can only be quoted in hopes of letting the reader judge its
persuasiveness:
The right to be free from infliction of harm without due process as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment usually applies to pretrial detainees. E.g., Arroyo v. Schaefer,
548 F.2d 47, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1977). In limited instances, a regulation or statute may
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The significance of the district court's alternative holding is not exactly clear. In
finding that prior process was not required, the district court apparently based its
conclusion on some form of balance between the state's and inmate's respective inter-
ests."5
 But even if a court determines that prior process is not required, the question of
post-deprivation process still remains. Under Hudson, after finding no need for prior
process, the court should have analyzed post-deprivation remedies to insure that they
were adequate."° This the district court did not do. Reconciling the district court's
conclusion in Whitley with the Supreme Court's holdings in Parratt and Hudson is thus
impossible."' Daniels offers no help, for the shooting in Whitley was clearly intentional. 353
Because the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rationale, which is wholly
contrary to that found in Parratt and Hudson, it appears that the Court itself has implicitly
rejected its Patiall -Hudson analysis.
The suggestion might be made that essentially the district court in Whitley applied
this Article's premise, recognizing that where prior process is impossible procedural due
process is not at issue. Whitley, however, does not present the proper facts for a total
rejection of procedural due process. Procedural due process is a flexible concept, and
need not necessarily encompass a full-fledged hearing. 359
 Instead, notice alone can satisfy
procedural due process under certain circumstances, at least if the notice can minimize
the risk of error.369 In Whitley the plaintiff argued that some type of warning should
have been given prior to the shooting.'6r Conceivably this warning, or notice, could have
formed the basis of a colorable procedural due process challenge. The Supreme Court
did discuss the warning aspect of the plaintiff's argument, stating:
But there would be neither means nor time to inquire into the reasons why
each inmate acted as he did .... As petitioner's own experts conceded, a
verbal warning would have been desirable, in addition to a warning shot, if
create a due process interest enforceable by a prisoner, E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 559 (1974); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. I ... (1979). Here, no regulation or statute was cited which would give plaintiff
an expectation of a due process hearing prior to the alleged deprivation of liberty. See
Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 937 ...
(1981).
Whitley, 546 F. Supp. at 732 n. 1 . Apparently, because an inmate rather than a pre-trial detainee
was involved, the court felt that some regulation or statute was necessary to create a liberty interest.
Because none existed, neither did a protected interest.
355 Id.
556 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534 (1984).
357
 The argument might be pressed that the district court was applying a compelling interest
analysis, concluding that the state possessed a compelling interest in responding to the riot without
procedural safeguards. Thus, it might further be argued that the Supreme Court endorsed this
conclusion. Though this position is plausible, the Court has yet to apply similar reasoning so as to
completely dispense with process both before and after the fact. At most, by balancing interests the
Court has allowed for the postponement of process. Moreover, the Court in Whitley never addressed
compelling interests on the part of the state in its discussion of either substantive due process or
the eighth amendment. It is thus doubtful that the Court intended to endorse such a theory in
relation to procedural due process. Finally, it would not behoove the Court to adopt such a startling
approach to procedural due process in so summary a fashion.
5" Whitley v, Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1087 (1986).
359 See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
560 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
5 'n Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1087.
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circumstances permitted it to be given without undue risk. While a jury
might conclude that the omission was unreasonable, we think that an infer-
ence of wantonness could not properly be drawn. First, some warning was
given .... Second, the prison officials could have believed in good faith that
such a warning might endanger the success of the security measure .... 362
The Court thus viewed the warning issue from a substantive perspective, addressing the
failure to warn in terms of negligence and wantonness." 3 The issue should have been
treated as a procedural one, however, consistent with the approach proposed here.
Because the shooting was intentional, 384 state officials had the opportunity to provide
some form of prior process."" Process is also required because facts were in dispute. 3"
Under certain facts the shooting might have been justified while under others it might
not."7 If the prison official warned the inmate before shooting, the inmate might have
ceased his action, and consequently avoided the deprivation. 368 The inmate's failure to
"2 Id. (citations omitted).
SO Id.
3f4 Id.
363 Opportunity for a form of prior process, of course, would have to be resolved under the
facts of the case. In some situations it might be feasible to provide notice, while in others it might
not.
366 Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1086.
367 Presumably, the shooting would have been justified under state law to prevent the inmate's
escape or to quell a prison riot, Otherwise, it would not have been justified. Under federal law, as
eventually determined by the Court in Whitley, the shooting would have been justified where
"plausibly ... thought necessary," as opposed to being an "unjustified infliction of harm ... tanta-
mount to a knowing willingness that it occur." Id. at 1085. See infra notes 408-14 and accompanying
text. Thus, the federal standard is an "arguable" standard, which necessarily incorporates the state
justification. Under the federal substantive rule, the question is whether the conduct was arguably
justifiable under state law; that is, does some argument exist in support of the conduct. Because
the federal rule incorporates the state rule regarding justification, when one is determining whether
a reason for process exists — that is, whether facts are in dispute — one must look to state law.
This is true even though the liberty interest arises under federal law. See supra notes 295 and 317.
The same analysis should prove true in relation to any injury to the person. Where a person
is injured, whether an inmate or not, liberty is implicated under the federal Constitution. See supra
note 72 and accompanying text. In assessing whether a reason for prior process exists, it must be
determined whether the conduct is arguably justified. To make such a determination, the substantive
right must be analyzed. In relation to the liberty interest in being free from bodily harm, this
requires analyzing the constitutionally protected substantive right. In all but a few instances, how-
ever, see e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The
substantive right under constitutional law is simply an "arguable" right; such is the nature of
substantive due process. See infra notes 396-414 and accompanying text. Thus, as demonstrated
above, in assessing whether there might be justification, state law will have to be considered. In
those cases where constitutional law supersedes state law, the Constitution controls the justification.
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). See in contrast, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978) (liberty interest in being free from suspension arguably arises under Constitution but state
.law still determines whether deprivation correct); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 551 (1977) (same).
368 Consider also the facts of City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), a classical
"excessive force" case. There a policeman intentionally shot and killed a suspect whom he believed
possessed a deadly weapon. Id. at 810-11, The Tuttle Court failed to address whether there was in
fact a constitutional violation, instead resolving only the issue of municipal liability. Id. at 817 n.4.
The case theoretically presented a colorable procedural due process claim, analogous to that in
Whitley. The shooting was intentional and therefore there might have been an opportunity for some
warning or notice which apparently was not given. See id. at 811. As in Whitley, facts were in dispute,
in that the shooting in Tuttle occurred because the policeman erroneously believed the victim was
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heed the warning would have, conversely, reinforced the official's conviction that the
shooting was required and justified. Of course, as noted earlier, simply passing this
threshold issue does not mean this form of prior process is constitutionally required.
The Court must take the next step and decide what sort of process the Constitution
requires, and must also consider whether, on balance, process should occur prior to the
deprivation.9G3 When both opportunity and reason for process exist, however, procedural
due process is implicated in the first instance.
In summary, before a court should even consider procedural due process, some
possibility must exist that prior process could be afforded — an opportunity by the agent
who caused the deprivation, or the state through its established procedure, to provide
prior process. In cases like Parratt, where the agent's negligence caused the deprivation,
there is no opportunity for process as such. Because the agent does not know the
deprivation will occur, he cannot notify the victim or otherwise provide process. The
state also cannot provide process, because the accidental injury is wholly unauthorized.
In addition, even when some opportunity for prior process exists, there must also be a
reason for it. Facts must be in dispute. Where there exists no purported justification for
the deprivation, that is, where no facts support it as in Hudson, then there is no reason
for process. Unless both conditions are satisfied, procedural due process is not relevant,
and is not at issue in the case.
D. Comparing Daniels
Consistent with this Article's approach, the argument might be made that because
negligent conduct never affords an opportunity for prior process, negligent acts may
never implicate procedural due process. Some might suggest that the Daniels conclusion
is necessarily correct, and provides a more direct route to the same result. The Daniels
holding does appear to bear some correlation with this Article's proposed analysis. But
it is not a perfect correlation 3" and it does not solve the problem presented by those
cases which involve gross negligence or intentional conduct. Instead, Daniels simply draws
a bright line between negligence and other more culpable mental states, leaving the
latter to treatment under the Parratt-Hudson rationale. Thus, even if it is true that cases
involving negligence necessarily present no opportunity for prior process, Daniels only
solves part of the problem. A more comprehensive analysis is still needed because not
all cases involving gross negligence or intentional conduct implicate procedural due
process. 3n
reaching for a gun. Id. Notice may have helped resolve this factual dispute. Note that a similar
argument might also be made in relation to the situation in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4
(1985), where a policeman shot and killed a suspected fleeing felon. That case was resolved, however,
under a fourth amendment analysis. Id. at 7. The Court held that Tennessee's justification, which
allowed the shooting of any fleeing felon, authorized an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 20.
349 In a situation where a person is about to be shot, the interest in one's life or physical well-
being should generally outweigh any interests the state might have in delaying process. Contrast
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (state's interest in administrative efficiency outweighs
individual's interest in receiving social security benefits). Also, the risk of there being an erroneous
decision seems much higher than that in Mathews, and the harm inflicted, if there were an error,
would be much more substantial than that in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). Weighing
these factors should counsel in favor of prior process.
"0 See infra notes 371-72 and accompanying text.
5" See supra notes 311-25 and accompanying text.
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As a preliminary matter, the exact holdings of Daniels and Davidson must be isolated.
Daniels and Davidson stand for the proposition that before procedural due process need
be considered there must exist an intentional, or perhaps grossly negligent, 372 deprivation.
Therefore, the injury — the interference with the substantive interest in life, liberty, or
property — must result from intentional, or at least grossly negligent, conduct. Indeed,
this principle seems simple when stated, but applying it has proved problematic. In fact,
at least two federal circuit courts have misread the Daniels and Davidson decisions, and
instead of focusing on the mens rea relative to the protected interest at stake have focused
on the mental state relative to the process due. Consequently, in both Brunken v. Lance375
and Deretich v. Office of Administrative Hearings, 374 the courts concluded that because the
respective states, through their agents, were merely negligent in failing to provide prior
process, Daniels required dismissal."" Each case contained an intentional deprivation, yet
the courts held that the negligent failure to provide process did not implicate the due
process clause.""
372 Whether gross negligence will suffice to state a claim was left open by Daniels. 106 S. Ct. at
666. But see Davidson, 106 S. CL at 671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recklessness enough to state a
claim); id, at 675 (Blackniun, J., dissenting) (same); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277
(6th Cir. 1987) (gross negligence enough); cf. Bradberry v. Pinellas County, 789 F.2d 1513 (11th
Cir. 1986) (noting but not answering the question); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc.
Serv., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987) (assumes, without deciding, gross negligence enough); Bergquist
v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (gross negligence enough); McClary v. O'Hare,
786 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1986) (suggesting, under circumstances, gross negligence enough); Villante v.
Dcptartment of Corrections, 786 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1986) (gross negligence enough); McKenna v.
City of Memphis, 785 F.2d 560 (6111 Cir. 1986) (suggesting something more than negligence enough
to state a claim); Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 (1986) (something
more than negligence enough to state a claim); Uberoi v. University of Colorado, 713 P.2d 894
(Colo. 1986) (same).
373 807 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
374 798 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1986).
'" Brunken, 807 F.2d at. 1331; Deretich, 798 F.2d at 1154.
376 In Brunken, a social worker suspected that a minor was being sexually abused by her father.
807 F.2d at 1327. Therefore, a "shelter care hearing" was scheduled, but no notice of this hearing
was sent to the father. Id. Subsequently the minor was placed in the custody of the Department of
Children and Family Services of Illinois. Id. The father sued under § 1983 claiming that he had
been deprived of liberty without due process of law. Id. at 1328. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that the father stated no claim under procedural due process because the
failure to send notice was not intentional; rather it was only a negligent oversight on the part of'
the social worker. Id. at 1331. Thus, the court concluded that the Daniels decision precluded the
claim. Id.
In Deretich, a state employee was discharged without an adequate hearing. 798 F.2d at 1149-
50. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, relying on Daniels, stated:
[Al procedural due process claim under section 1983 must show that the constitutional
infringement resulted from 'more than lack of due care by a state official.' If OAH's
procedures were deficient, Deretich must show that the deficiency resulted from more
than mere negligence.
798 F.2d at 1151 (quoting Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665.)
The courts in both cases incorrectly focused on process rather than on the deprivation suffered.
In assessing the applicability of the Court's holding in Daniels — that negligence cannot rise to a
violation of due process — the courts should have determined whether the deprivation resulted
from negligent conduct, rather than focusing on the omission of process. This was aptly explained
by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1986),
where a Tennessee inmate challenged procedures afforded him prior to his being disciplined. The
Franklin court stated:
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Unquestionably, these cases are wrong. The logic of Brunken and Deretich would do
away with practically all procedural due process claims, leaving subject to constitutional
scrutiny only those involving a state agent who consciously, or in a grossly negligent
fashion, disregards the requirement of prior process.'" Thus, a state agent's ignorance
of constitutional law could effectively spell a complete defense. Although this might be
desirable when considering damages and immunity, it is not desirable when attempting
to identify the underlying constitutional violation.
If the Brunken and Deretich decisions accurately interpreted Daniels, then Daniels in
no way correlates with this Article's analysis. For example, if Brunken and Deretich cor-
rectly interpret Daniels, then Logan, which held that Parretti does not apply when activity
pursuant to an established state procedure destroys a property interest, has been over-
ruled. Under the analysis proposed here, in contrast, the Logan Court's holding certainly
survives. Logan, it may be remembered, was a case where the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Commission (the Commission), "through inadvertence," terminated an em-
ployment discrimination claim by not convening a timely conference.'" This inadvert-
ence at best could be deemed negligence, which, under Brunken and Deretich, cannot
support a procedural due process claim. Logan would, therefore, be dead. Under the
analysis offered here, however, Logan surely survives because the Commission clearly
had an opportunity to convene a timely conference prior to the deprivation in that case;
it simply failed to do S0.379 In addition, the second prong of this Article's analysis is
satisfied because facts surrounding the claim's validity were in dispute.'" A reason existed
for prior process, that is, sifting through claims to determine which should and should
not proceed.
Even without Brunken's and Deretich's misinterpretations of the Daniels decision,
squaring the Logan holding with that of Daniels might still prove difficult. On the one
Under Daniels, the focus in determining whether a protected interest is 'deprived' is
on the conduct which has allegedly injured the life, liberty or property interest, and
on whether that conduct was negligent or involved some greater mental state, e.g.,
recklessness or deliberateness. The conduct which allegedly injured Franklin's liberty
interest, and which is therefore the focus of our Daniels inquiry, is the Disciplinary
Board's decision to place him in disciplinary segregation, rather than the Board's
alleged failure to afford adequate procedures by not rendering a post-hearing written
statement.
Id. at 1262. The court's reasoning makes sense. The Daniels Court itself distinguished cases involving
negligent omissions of process. See 106 S. Ct. at 666 ("We think the relevant action of the prison
officials (in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)j ... is their deliberate decision to deprive the
inmate of good-time credit, not their hypothetically negligent failure to accord him the procedural
protections of The Due Process Clause."). See also Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F,2d 1094, 1105 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub norn. Patton v. Sourbeer, 107 S. Ct. 3276 (1987). CI.Burch v. Appalachee
Community Mental Health Serv., 804 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated and reh'g en banc granted,
812 F,2d 1339 (1987) (mislocusing on absence of process in applying Parrott); Gregory v. Town of
Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304 (Me. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1018 (1985) (same); both discussed supra
notes 41 and 294 and infra note 381.
3" See Santiago v. Garcia, 821 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1987) (refusing to read Daniels decision in this
way for fear it would overrule other due process decisions).
373
 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 426 (1982).
379 Note the Logan Court's comment in this regard: "[lit is the state system itself that destroys
a complainant's property interest, by operation of law, whenever the Commission fails to convene
a timely conference — whether the Commission's action is taken through negligence, maliciousness,
or otherwise." 455 U.S. at 436.
389 See id. at 434.
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hand, it can be argued that the two are consistent because, even though the state
commission in Logan was negligent in failing to provide a timely conference, the plaintiff
challenged an "established state procedure," and this procedure surely resulted from
the state's intentional conduct. Consequently, the argument goes, the state intentionally
deprived Logan of property, satisfying the requirement of Daniels. The problem with
this position is that the state required a conference, evidencing its desire not to terminate
claims without hearings."' The state's intent was not to deprive the victim of his claim,
at least not until he had received full process. Saying that the state system intended to
deprive certain randomly selected individuals of property is pure fiction. Indeed, the
same argument could be made in relation to almost any deprivation, since the "system"
is the moving force behind all state actors' conduct.
In contrast, the argument that Logan involved only a negligent deprivation is not
totally convincing. In Logan, the "negligence" was in failing to provide process. Unlike
the situations in Drunken and Deretich, no other action was required to accomplish the
deprivation: 382 rather, the state's failure to afford process as a matter of law terminated
the interest involved. Thus, in one sense, it seems that the termination — the deprivation
— resulted from negligence. Failing to provide process amounted to a deprivation, both
of which resulted from the state's negligence. But some might argue that although the
failure to afford process resulted from negligence, the claim's termination resulted from
an intervening force: the operation of state law. This intervening force must be char-
acterized as intentional, because a state law cannot be negligently enacted. Thus, negli-
gence did not cause the deprivation; the real cause was an intentionally enacted state
law. Though "fiction," the argument has some appeal. If it were accepted, perhaps the
Logan decision could be safely squared with Daniels. Reconciling the two decisions,
however, is difficult, and this difficulty further illustrates the questionable basis of the
Daniels holding. Because mens rea is always a relative concept, it is often hard to define.
58I Thus, to a certain extent Logan appears to be a case where although the state itself satisfied
due process, the state actor did not. Sie supra note 41 and accompanying text. In this regard,
consider Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304 (Me. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1018 (1985);
and Burch v. Appalachee Community Mental Health Serv., 804 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated
and reh'g en bane granted, 812 F.2d 1330 (1987), discussed supra notes 41, 294, and 328. In Gregory
state law required that notice be sent prior to the termination or general assistance benefits but,
pursuant to the 'town's own policy, town officials failed to send notice. 479 A.2d at 1305. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found the Parma decision controlling. Id, at 1308. In dissenting
from the Court's denial of certiorari, Justice O'Connor stated:
Inc Supreme Judicial Court's] conclusion rests on a reading of Parratt v. Taylor that
is more expansive than this Court previously has endorsed , [H]ere the town of
Pittsfield had a policy, contrary to the requirements of state law, not to provide written
notice to applicants denied general assistance. If we assume, arguendo, that due process
requires the provision of such notice, it is questionable whether Parratt suggests that
a municipal policy denying those procedures comports with the Constitution so long
as state law makes some remedy available.
470 U.S. at 1021-22. Contrast Messick v. Levins, 811 F.2d 1439, 1442 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding
Logan controlling where municipal policy causes deprivation irrespective of state law).
"2 In most cases, as illustrated by Drunken and Deretich, the failure to provide process and the
deprivation are separate events. For example, in Brunken, the child had to be taken away before
the father was deprived of liberty. Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1327-28 (7th Cir. 1986). In
Deretich, the prisoner had to be disciplined before a deprivation occurred. Deretich v. Office of
Administrative Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (8th Cir. 1986). These were separate and distinct
from the failure to provide process.
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Moreover, although one entity might be merely negligent, another entity may act inten-
tionally. Thus, in Logan although the Commission was negligent, the state arguably acted
with intent. Forcing the analysis to turn on the mental state is an overly contrived
approach to the problem.
The better approach is simply to recognize that the Commission in Logan had the
opportunity to supply prior process but failed to do so, for whatever reason. Although
mental state is not unimportant, it does not constitute the sole operative fact in this
Article's analysis. As a general rule, when the agent acts negligently neither that agent
nor the state has the opportunity to provide process. But as Logan illustrates, in some
situations, although the agent is negligent, the state has authorized the action through
an established procedure and thereby acted intentionally relative to the deprivation.
Moreover, even when an opportunity for prior process exists, so must a reason for it.
Equating negligence with lack of opportunity thus would only work to apply part of the
proposed analysis. For these reasons, the analysis found in Daniels does not present an
effective model for determining when procedural due process has not been satisfied,
and should accordingly he rejected.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
One criticism of this Article's approach to procedural due process lies in its apparent
disparate treatment of more egregious conduct by state officials."' Conduct which per-
haps can be justified receives procedural protection, while conduct which cannot, gen-
erally the more egregious of the two, receives none. The rejoinder to this criticism lies
in the very nature of process. The process mechanism protects against incorrect sub-
stantive decisions by minimizing the risk of their occurrence.'" Where the substantive
action can in no way be justified because it is inherently incorrect, there is no reason for
process.s"S Instead, the answer lies only in substance.
For this reason, and to further alleviate the fear that no protection from abusive
government conduct exists, substantive due process must be considered. Lower courts
have effectively turned to substantive due process in an effort to avoid what they have
perceived to be the restrictive nature of Parrait-Hudson. In this context, courts have used
due process in two ways: to incorporate specific guarantees found in the Bill of Rights,'"
"3 See supra notes 320-25 and accompanying text.
3" See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
"6 In its incorporative sense, due process has been used to protect rights guaranteed by the
first amendment, see e.g., Labov v. Lalley, 809 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1987); Burton v. Livingston, 791
F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986); Uberoi v. University of
Colorado, 713 13.2d 894 (Colo. 1986); the fourth amendment, see e.g., Mann v. City of Tucson Dep't
of Police, 782 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1986); Sanders v, Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1986); King v.
Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1986); Griffen v. Wilke, 804 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3184 (1987); Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986); Smith
v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir, 1987); New v. City of Minneapolis, 792 F.2d 724 (8th
Cir. 1986); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1986); Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513
(6th Cir. 1987); Willson v. City of Des Moines, 386 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 432
(1986); and the eighth amendment, see e.g., McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986); Cay
v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1986); Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1986); Thomas v.
Booker, 784 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1975-76 (1986); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d
1187 (11th Cir. 1987). In addition, apart from due process, application of the holding of Parratt
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and to independently protect life, liberty, and property.'" Courts have had little difficulty
under the former approach, because the substantive limits found in the applicable specific
guarantee become those of substantive due process. For example, following the decision
of Tennessee v. Garner, which held that the police shooting of a fleeing suspect was a
"seizure" for purposes of the fourth amendment,'" courts have relied on the fourth
amendment in their efforts to delineate the boundaries of "excessive force."'" The
fourth amendment's substantive guideline is "reasonableness," a concept tailor-made for
judicial interpretation.
Applying substantive due process simplicter as an independent check on state action
has proven more difficult, especially in the context of constitutional torts. The problem,
of course, lies in the fact that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause provides
no explicit guidance concerning what is substantively impermissible. Thus, when holding
that state action violates substantive due process, a court may be charged with "Loch-
nerization": 39° substituting a judicial evaluation for that more properly left to other
branches of government.
has been avoided through the invocation of equal protection. See, e.g., Burton v. Livingston, 791
F.2d 97 (8th Cir, 1986) (attack by guard because of race).
387 See Comment, supra note 242, at 623 ii.127. ("Before Daniels and Davidson, there appeared
to he a general consensus among the lower federal courts that the Parrett analysis did not apply to
substantive due process violations.") (collecting cases). That proposition remains true even after the
decision in Daniels. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987); Dugan v.
Brooks, 818 F.2t1 513 (6th Cir. 1987); Griffen v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3184 (1987); Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1986), as amended, 807 F.2d 1514
(1987), petition for cert. filed, June 9, 1987; McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir, 1986);
Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1986); New v. City of Minneapolis, 792 F.2d 724 (8th
Cir. 1986); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 1 7.2d 1209
(1st Cir. 1986); Archie v. City of Racine, No. 86-1783, slip op. (1st Cir. Aug. 10, 1987); Williams v.
City of St. Louis, 783 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1986); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444 (9th
Cir. 1986); Shapiro v. Chapman, 70 Md. App. 307, 520 A.2d 1330 (1987); 423 South Salina Street,
Inc. v. City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 503 N.E.2d 63, 510 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 1880 (1987).
388 4 7 1 U.S. I, 10-11 (1985).
388 Several lower courts have found fourth amendment violations arising from police shooting
or other forms of brutality. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987); Dugan
v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1987); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 815 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1987)
(vacated and reargued); Griffen v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3184
(1987); New v. City of Minneapolis, 792 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1986); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d
1209 (1st Cir. 1986); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (5th Cir. 1985); Robins v. Harum,
773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985); Gunn v. Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1644 (1986); Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252 (4th .Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court, however,
has expressly left open the question of whether "excessive force" amounts to a fourth amendment
or due process violation. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 n.4 (1986). Moreover,
other lower courts have been reluctant to use the fourth amendment in excessive force cases. See,
e.g., Hayes v. Vessey, 777 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1985); Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349 (5th
Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985). In any event, courts have turned to
fourth amendment jurisprudence as a way of avoiding the holding of Pan-ati. See, e.g., Sanders v.
Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1986); King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1986); Mann v.
City of Tucson Dept. of Police, 782 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1986); Willson v. City of Des Moines, 386
N.W.2d 76 (lowa), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 432 (1986). This approach, however, may not be as
successful in avoiding the Court's holding in Daniels. See, e.g., Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806
F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the Daniels decision to fourth amendment claim); McDonough
v. Jorda, 214 N.J. Super. 338, 519 A.2d 874 (A.D. 1986) (same).
39° The great majority of what are called "substantive" rights are created by the states. Others,
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For this reason, the Supreme Court and lower courts alike have been somewhat
hesitant to invalidate state action under substantive due process, at least where no specific
constitutional guarantee acts as a guide. This does not mean, however, that state action
is immune from substantive scrutiny under the due process clause. To the contrary,
lower courts have willingly reviewed state officials' conduct on a limited basis, generally
applying an approach analogous to that found in Rochin v. California."' In Rochin, the
Court held that where police illegally entered a suspect's home, struggled with the suspect
to open his mouth, and then forcibly pumped his stomach in order to obtain evidence,
the conduct so "shocked the conscience" as to violate substantive due process. 392 More
recently, courts have applied a similar "we know it when we see it" 393 approach to find
"shocking" conduct violative of due process."4
Although Rochin offers one method of dealing with substantive due process, it is by
no means the best method. The problem with Rochin is that it offers no syntax, no
structure for defining substantive rights. 595 The Court has only recently begun to provide
guidance in defining substantive rights in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing" 6 and
Whitley v. Albers. 397
In Ewing, a case decided shortly before Daniels, a student sued his university claiming
that the university violated substantive due process because it arbitrarily and capriciously
did not allow him to retake an examination. 398 Following a four day bench trial, the
in contrast, are created by the federal government through the Congress. In modern times the
Court has been extremely reluctant to create its own rights under substantive due process, see, e.g.,
Williamson v, Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), though it has done so in the limited context of
privacy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court was much more willing to second-
guess legislative decisions in the past, thus creating substantive rights under the guise of due process.
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). But "Lochnerization" has fallen by the wayside;
since 1937, and the advent of true "rational basis" scrutiny, not one state or federal law has been
invalidated under that analysis. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 472 (11th ed. 1985).
31 ' 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
992 1d. at 172.
S8'
	 approach bears a striking resemblance to that once used by Justice Stewart to identify
obscenity. See jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
594 Compare Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513 (Gth Cir. 1987) (finding conduct shocking); Nishi-
yama v. Dicksonr County, 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (same); Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d
573 (4th Cir.) (same), rehearing en bane granted, 802 F.2d 1486 (1986); Burton v. Livingston, 791
F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1986) (same); and
Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); with Johnson v. Barker, 799
F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding conduct not so egregious as to shock conscience); Fitzgerald v.
Williamson, 787 F.2d 403 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); and Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (same). Many of these courts have combined the Rochin Court's analysis with a more
refined analysis, found in Johnson v. Glick, thus giving at least some guidance to what amounts to a
substantive due process violation. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Employee-Officer
John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). See also infra note 411. See, e.g., Fundiller v. City of Cooper
City, 777 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1985); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1985)
(en banc); Rinker v. Napa County, 820 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1987); Sampson v. Gilmore, 106 S. Ct.
1993 (1986).
395 At least one court has had difficulty using the Rochin decision as a guide through the
quagmire of substantive due process. See Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir.), rehearing
en bane granted, 802 F.2d 1486 (1986).
596
	 S. Ct. 507 (1985).
"7 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986).
"3 Ewing, 106 S. Ct. at 508.
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district court held that no due process violation had occurred because the university had
"good reason" to dismiss the student from the program. 899 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that the university acted arbitrarily in
not abiding by its own established practice of allowing students to retake examinations:"}°
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, reversed the Sixth Circuit's
determination." Assuming that a protected property interest existed in "continued
enrollment," 4" the Court applied substantive due process guarantees and determined
that when reviewing the substance of academic decisions, courts should show deference
to the professional judgment of school administrators. "Plainly, they may not override it
unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judg-
ment."4°9 According to the Court, the question was whether any reason supported the
university's decision. 4 °4 Therefore, so long as the dismissal was supported by some reason
"not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decision-making" no substantive violation
would result.408
From a theoretical plane, this analysis appears to mesh well with the previous
discussion of procedural due process. A reason for process exists only where facts are
in dispute. 41° In a situation where the state would not be justified in acting under any
set of facts, there is no reason for process and thus no procedural due process violation: 107
But where the state acts with no reason, its conduct could very easily be deemed irrational,
and thus violate both Ewing's tenets and substantive due process.
Ewing, of course, involved a comtemplative decision by a state agency. Whitley to.
Albers established that the same approach can be applied in a tort context. 4 °8 In Whitley,
decided shortly after Daniels, an inmate who was shot by a prison official during a prison
riot subsequently brought a section 1983 action claiming that he had been denied his
eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. 4 "9 The Court, speaking through Justice O'Con-
nor, found no substantive due process or eighth amendment violation and established
1 '° Id. at 511 (quoting 559 F. Sums. 791, 800 (E. Mich. 1983)).
400 Ewing v. Board of Regents, 742 F.2d 913, 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
4" Ewing, 106 S. Ct. at 515.
4°Y
	 at 512. That one must possess a "protected interest" in order to be accorded the benefits
of substantive due process is a curious suggestion indeed, perhaps even more so than in relation
to procedural due process. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text. Generally, at least in
relation to substantive if not procedural due process, the prevailing opinion of courts and com-
mentators has been that "life, liberty, and property" are not selective terms. See Monaghan, supra
note 46, at 433. Rather, substantive due process at a minimum has provided protection against
arbitrary or irrational government conduct. Thus, where one is injured by arbitrary government
action, there should be a substantive due process violation irrespective of whether there is a
"protected interest." All that need be satisfied are general standing requirements: injury in fact, a
causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and the likelihood of redress by a favorable
decision. See, e.g., Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
"3 Ewing, 106 S. Ct. at 513.
.04 Id.
490 Id. at 515. The Court also stated: "The question, then, is whether the record compels the
conclusion that the University acted arbitrarily in dropping Ewing from the ... program without
permitting a reexamination." Id. at 512.
See supra notes 332-69 and accompanying text.
'07 See supra text accompanying notes 315-19.
"" 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1088 (1986).
409 Id. at 1083.
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the following test: "whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary,
or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as
is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur."41° The Court also qualified the
deferential nature of this analysis, stating: "It does not insulate from review actions taken
in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, but it requires that neither judge nor jury
freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered
choice."411 •
Though the Whitley decision specifically addressed eighth amendment constraints,
its rationale also applies to substantive due process. The Whitley Court recognized as
much and drew a parallel between the guarantees.
It would indeed be surprising if, in the context of forceful prison security
measures, "conduct that shocks the conscience" or "afford[s) brutality the
cloak of law," and so violates the Fourteenth Amendment, were not also
punishment "inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency" and "re-
pugnant to the conscience of mankind," in violation of the Eighth [Amend-
rnent1.412
In the prison context, the Court accordingly found that "the Due Process Clause affords
... no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." 4 "
Though this statement leaves open the possibility that it might afford less protection,
this seems unlikely. The Court in Whitley, although not ruling on the issue, suggested
that due process affords at least the same protection to those "persons enjoying unre-
stricted liberty."414 Any other approach would indeed be anomalous. This Article ac-
cordingly submits that the Whitley Court's analysis, because it is, like Ewing, deferential
to the states, necessarily reflects the minimum protections available under due process.
Thus, in order to determine whether a substantive due process violation occurs
when a state actor injures someone in person or property, 415 the basic test is "whether
the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary.'416
 Put another way, the
question is whether some reason supports the action. Without a reason, the state's action
is taken "in bad faith for no legitimate purpose" 417 and a substantive violation occurs.
4101d. at 1085.
411 Id. See also Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). In Glick, which the Court relied
upon in Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1085, the court found a cognizable due process claim where a guard
assaulted a pre-trial detainee. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033. Writing for the court, Judge Friendly stated:
Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights. In determining whether
the constitutional line.has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need
for the application of force, the relationship for the need and the amount of force
that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.
Id. (emphasis added).
412 Glick, 481 F.2d at 1088 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), and Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 106 (1976)).
412
 Id. at 1088.
414 Id.
412
 Note that where the injury is to person or property there is no question concerning whether
a "protected interest" exists. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
416 Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1085.
417Id.
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Analyzing claims that involve random and unauthorized conduct such as that found
Parrott, Hudson, and Daniels should proceed along the same lines as found in Whitley.
Where the state inflicts the injury for no plausible reason, substantive due process is
violated. For example, if a police officer incarcerates a suspect and then sexually assaults
her, a substantive violation occurs.41 ° Clearly no reason supports this conduct - it is "in
bad faith and for no legitimate purpose." 419 The same holds true if a police officer strikes
a suspect without plausible reason. 4"
Similarly, wanton conduct by state officials might very well offend substantive due
process, at least where the wantonness reflects "a knowing willingness that [injury]
occur." 421 For example, if the prison guard in Whitley shot into a crowd of prisoners
without reason, a substantive due process violation would have occurred even though
there was no "intent," within the strict sense of that word, to cause injury. Under this
analysis, it is enough that the actor knows injury will occur, and yet has no reason for
inflicting it.
Where the state actor does not intentionally or wantonly injure a victim, however,
Whitley indicates that generally no substantive due process violation has occurred. 422
4" See Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1987). This was essentially the situation
in Harris, where the existence of a constitutional violation was really not disputed. Id. at 500. The
major challenge in that case was to possible municipal liability. Id. at 501. See also Jones v. City of
Chicago, 787 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1986) (sexual assault by public health physician).
419 See Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1085.
420 See supra note 387 (collecting cases).
421 See Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1085.
422 Following the Court's decision in Daniels, most courts have found that negligence is insuf-
ficient to implicate substantive due process, see, e.g., Lunde v. OK 806 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1986);
Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986); Mann v. City of Tucson, Dept. of Police, 782
F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating negligence insufficient to implicate due process after Daniels);
McDonough v. Jorda, 214 N.J. Super. 338, 519 A.2d 874 (A.D. 1986), although the Daniels decision
itself did not clearly address the issue. Contrast Comment, supra note 242 at 623, 631 ("after Daniels
and Davidson, if a substantive due process violation occurs because of a state actor's negligence, it
is apparently not actionable under section 1983," although "arguably only procedural due process
is implicated by those holdings"); with Nahmod, Due Process, supra note 131, at 254 (Daniels requires
more than negligence to implicate both procedural and substantive due process). Irrespective of
Daniels, however, most cases that have found a substantive due process violation have involved
intentional conduct. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987); Dugan v.
Brooks, 818 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1987); Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1987); Griffin v,
Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3184 (1987); Simmons v, Dickhaut, 804
F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1986); Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1986), as amended, 807 F.2d 1514
(1987); Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1986); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th
Cir. 1986); New v. City of Minneapolis, 792 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1986); Burton v. Livingston, 791
F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986); Fernandez v, Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1986); Williams v. City of
St. Louis, 783 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1986); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir.
1986); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1985); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta,
774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied sub nom Sampson v. Gilmere, 106 S. Ct. 1970
(1986); Guinz v. Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644 (1986);
Shapiro v. Chapman, 70 Md. App. 307, 520 A.2d 1330 (1987). Even before the Daniels decision,
courts uniformly recognized that simple negligence would never be sufficient to implicate substan-
tive due process. See, e.g., Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Beebe,
770 F,2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en basic), although opinions now differ over whether recklessness or
perhaps gross negligence could be sufficient to implicate due process. Contrast Nishiyanta v. Dickson
County, 814 F.2d 277, 283 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (gross negligence under certain circumstances
might be enough); and justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573, 578-79 (4th Cir.), reh'g en bane granted, 803
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Where the injury was not intentionally caused, the actor generally will have acted with
reason — attempting to accomplish one purpose when another, the injury, somehow
results. So long as a legitimate reason supports the first purpose, the conduct should not
be deemed irrational. Consequently, the fact that a state actor negligently, or even
recklessly, injures someone should not make that conduct irrational and violative of due
process 429 For example, suppose a police officer, while attempting to make an arrest,
draws a gun, cocks the hammer, and places the gun in the suspect's back while trying to
handcuff the suspect. Assume the gun then accidentally discharges, wounding or killing
the suspect.424
 If the police officer's purpose was to make an arrest, but not injure the
suspect, then that conduct should withstand scrutiny under substantive due process.
Such conduct, though a poor or even grossly negligent method of making an arrest, is
F.2c1 1486 (1986) (same); and McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 89 n.6 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); with
Waggoner v. Mosti, 792 F.2d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1986) (Krupanskyd., dissenting) (must be intentional
conduct).
' 23
 A better argument might exist for finding that recklessness violates substantive due process
in the context of prisoners or pre-trial detainees being injured. It would appear in such a situation
that the government is under some affirmative duty to care for the inmates, a duty which does not
exist in relation to the general public. See e.g., Villante v. Deptartment of Corrections, 786 F.2d
516, 519 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirmative duty to protect prisoners). It would appear that before a
substantive due process violation occurs, however, there must exist at least deliberate indifference
to the needs of the prisoner or detainee, See, e.g., City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp.,
463 "U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983) (deliberate indifference required); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986) (same).
This standard has been recognized in the context of the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1986); Johnston v. Lucas, 786
F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1986). See also Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1986) (pre-trial detainee);
Thomas v. Booker, 784 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.) (pre-trial detainee), ceri. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1975 (1986).
This makes sense in respect to due process because only in the case of deliberate indifference can
it be said that injury was inflicted without reason. Perhaps the better approach is to analyze cases
involving prisoners according to eighth amendment principles, see Whitley v. Albers, 106 S. Ct.
1078, 1088 (1986); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987), then achieve equivalency with
this eighth amendment standard for pre-trial detainees through due process. See Bell, 441 U.S. at
533 ("We do not doubt that the Due Process Clause protects a detainee.").
Youngberg v. Romeo is consistent with this approach. 1457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Youngberg Court
dealt with whether those involuntarily committed to a state mental institution have substantive due
process rights to "(i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii)
training or 'habilitation.
— Id. at 309 (footnote omitted). The Court found protected interests in all
three categories, but also clearly found that a reviewing court should show deference to the
professional judgment exercised by the confining institution. Id. at 324. The Court stated, in relation
to safety and bodily restraint, that "the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that
professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been made." Id. at 32 (citation omitted). In
relation to habilitation, that is, training, the Court again emphasized deference, stating that habi-
litation decisions "made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of correct-
ness." Id. at 324. Consequently, in relation to those under the state's care, the Youngberg Court
essentially said that so long as the state has some reason for its action, substantive due process is
served. Therefore, substantive due process is violated only where state actors intentionally harm
those committed, or are deliberately indifferent to their needs. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (deliberate indifference violates substantive due process).
42' These are essentially the facts presented in Wilson v. Beebe, where a majority of the Court
found no substantive due process violation. 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985). The court relied on the
"shock the conscience" test found in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), and found that
negligent conduct is not so shocking as to implicate substantive due process.
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arguably rational because it serves the end of making an arrest. Reason exists for the
action, even though it ultimately causes injury.
Between the poles of negligence and malice lies the possibility of intentional harm
motivated by some reason other than simple injury. For example, suppose a police officer
intentionally shoots a suspect to prevent her flight from the scene of a crime. 425 There
should exist no substantive due process violation under these facts because the officer's
purpose, or motive, is to stop the suspect's flight and not simply to injure. A reason
supports the conduct because stopping flight is a legitimate purpose and the officer's
conduct arguably serves this end. The key, therefore, appears to rest in the motivation
for the action. Where the motive is simply to harm, or reflects total indifference about
whether harm occurs, substantive due process is offended. So long as some legitimate
reason exists for the action other than simply inflicting harm, however, there exists no
substantive due process violation.
Although Rochin offers one method of analyzing substantive due process, its guide-
lines are vague and offer little help in assessing substantive due process.426 The problem
rests in developing a more workable standard which both provides guidance and operates
within the due process framework. Because the phrase "due process of law" literally
offers no guidance of its own, the most justifiable approach is one which defers to the
judgment of state officials. 427 As made clear by the Court in Ewing and Whitley, under
this deferential analysis a state actor's conduct violates substantive due process only when
a state actor inflicts injury without reason.
How Brain can be reconciled with these most recent pronouncements regarding
substantive due process is unclear. The Court cited Rochin favorably in Whitley, and thus
it seems that the case has continuing validity. 428 Rochin does not, however, appear coex-
tensive with the Court's approach in Ewing and Whitley. The lower courts have disagreed
about whether Rochin reaches only intentional conduct or also applies to gross negli-
gence.426 Under Whitley, it appears that only a conscious decision implicates due pro-
cess. 431  Whitley therefore requires either intentional conduct or at a minimum wantonness
reflecting the actor's knowledge that injury will occur. Rochin, in. contrast, although
possibly more expansive in relation to the mess rea, might at the same time be more
restrictive in relation to injury. An intentionally inflicted injury might not be so egregious
as to "shock the conscience" of the court under Rochin. Moreover, it appears that Rochin
applies only to personal injury claim's, and not to property damage. 431 Apparently, the
Whitley approach is not so limited.
425 See, e,g,, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. I (1985) (where suspect is not thought to be
dangerous to police officer or others, fourth amendment is violated by shooting). See also Annot.,
supra note 247 (collecting other fourth amendment cases). The Court has yet to decide whether
cases founded on allegedly "excessive force" are supportable by either the fourth amendment or
due process. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 n.4 (1985) (discussed supra
note 368).
426 See supra note 395 and accompanying text,
427 See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
42 ' Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1088.
129 See supra note 422.
45° See supra notes 408-11 and accompanying text.
451 Sec Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954) (limiting Rocitin to cases involving "coercion,
violence or brutality to the person"); see, e.g., Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 141 1 (9th Cir.
1987) (personal injury); Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Griffin v. Mike,
804 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 198(i) (same); New v. City of Minneapolis, 792 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1986)
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Substantive due process offers a worthy alternative to a procedural analysis. Al-
though no procedural due process claim arises where a state actor intentionally injures
a person or property without reason, substantive due process might very well be impli-
cated under either the approach taken in Rochin or Ewing and Whitley. 452 And this
approach is preferable because substantive due process, unlike its procedural counter-
part,"" can be used to define the government's substantive duties. Unlike the extreme
result generated under procedural due process, where all torts inflicted by government
officials become federal claims,'" applying substantive due process would avoid this
result by simply defining the limits of the protected rights. In this way, substantive due
process, unlike procedural due process, is a flexible tool for defining those interests
which need federal protection.
CONCLUSION
Prior to any adverse governmental action which deprives a person of life, liberty,
or property, process must be afforded in order to guarantee the factual integrity of the
state's decision."" Consider one last time the hypothetical law requiring the destruction
of all houses built before the year 1900. Clearly, as a matter of procedural due process,
before a state can begin clearing away homes it must afford process to insure its sub-
stantive rule is properly applied.936 Thus, when speaking solely in terms of "the state,"
procedural due process is easily explained.
State action theory, however, has complicated procedural due process. Following
the Supreme Court's decision in Horne Telephone & Telegraph, not only are authorized
actions by state agents charged to the state, but also imputed are unauthorized and even
illegal actions."" Because of this, the state might wholly comport with due process
requirements, yet a procedural clue process violation might still occur if the state official
responsible for destroying homes fails to afford the required process."" For example, if
(same); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1985) (same); Gilmere v. City of
Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (same); Guma v. Marvissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985)
(same), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644 (1986); Shapiro v. Chapman, 70 Md. App. 307,520 A.2d 1330
(1987) (same). For example, in Costello v. Town of Fairfield, a case involving alleged arbitrary state
action in relation to property, the court refused to apply substantive due process. 811 F.2d 782,
784 (2d Cir. 1987). Likewise, in Schaper v. City of Huntsville, the court refused to analyze conduct
affecting property from the substantive side of due process, stating:
Indeed, allowing [a substantive claim] would effectively eviscerate the holding of
Parrott. It would allow a plaintiff to challenge a deprivation of a property interest on
the ground that it resulted from arbitrary and capricious state action, while under
ParrattlHudson, he would not be able to state a claim for the deprivation of the same
right on the ground that it resulted from a random and unauthorized act of a state
official. This remarkable result clearly was not envisioned by the Court in Parratt or
Hudson.
813 F.2d 709,718 (5th Cir. 1987) (citation and footnote omitted). But it would seem to have been
envisioned by the Ewing Court!
462 See supra notes 391-428 and accompanying text.
466
	 supra notes 286-319 and accompanying text.
464 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
436 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. Assuming, of course, no overriding state
interests exist which justify a postponement of process. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
467
	 supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
468 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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an official negligently or recklessly allows his bulldozer to destroy a home, this random
and unauthorized conduct must be attributed to the state. It thus might be argued that
despite state law requiring process, because the official afforded none prior to the
deprivation, procedural due process is somehow offended. 459 Yet clearly there should
be no procedural due process problem under these facts — not because some bright
line distinguishes between negligent, grossly negligent and intentional behavior, and not
because the state provides a remedy for the wrong, but because there simply is no reason
for process. Where there is no opportunity for the state or its agent to afford prior
process, nothing is served by speaking in terms of procedural due process.""
Now if the state official intentionally destroyed a home he believed was built before
1900 without affording prior process the result should differ."" Because an opportunity
for prior process exists in such a situation, the first prong of the proposed analysis is
satisfied. 442 The second prong is also satisfied because a reason undoubtedly exists under
these circumstances for having prior process.'" Ascertaining the date of the home's
construction is central to applying the rule. Consequently, procedural due process is
implicated by these facts despite whether state law authorizes the agent's conduct in not
providing a hearing.
If the official destroyed a home not because he believed it was built before 1900 but
for no reason whatsoever, procedural due process should not be a concern."'" Under
these circumstances, even though an opportunity for prior process exists, no reason
exists for having it. Process would not minimize the risk of error in applying the
substantive rule because the substantive decision is inherently erroneous. 443- If there is
no reason for an injury no facts can be in dispute, and without factual dispute, process
is useless.
This is the fundamental flaw in the Parratt-Hudson analysis. Under Parratt-Hudson,
courts apply procedural due process to fact patterns which in no way implicate proce-
dural concerns. In Parratt there was simply no opportunity for prior process, making it
impossible for process to minimize the risk of an erroneous decision.'- 05 In Hudson,
because the state's decision to destroy property was unauthorized and erroneous, no
reason supported it. 447 Process under such circumstances would have been useless be-
cause it would not have affected the substantive decision in any way. Hudson was not a
case where the substantive decision might have been proper under other facts. Rather,
the conduct in Hudson was unauthorized and resulted in a substantive decision that
should not have been made. In the absence of any factual dispute, therefore, procedural
due process was not truly at issue.'"
The analysis offered by this Article might be criticized as an effort to divest individ-
uals of civil- liberties and freedoms, since an admitted consequence of this approach
4 ' 9 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
449 See supra notes 286-311 and accompanying text.
441 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
442 See supra notes 286-311 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra notes 311-21 and accompanying text.
494 See supra notes 311-21 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 278 and 305 and accompanying text.
446 See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text,
4 4 7 See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
44" See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
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would be fewer civil rights actions:4 'g Moreover, without further constitutional study,
one might argue that the approach effectively de-federalizes the more egregious conduct
of state officials, 45" while taking a wholly mechanical approach to procedural due process.
Granted, the analysis suggested here is mechanical, but rightfully so, because procedure
is merely a tool to be used in forging a hopefully correct substantive decision. 45 ' In
addition, Part IV demonstrates that the more egregious conduct of state officials is not
necessarily relegated to state forums. Even though negligent deprivations generally will
not implicate procedural due process at all under the proposed analysis, 452 intentional
deprivations which fall outside procedural due process should often find protection
under substantive due process:155 The Court in Ewing and Whitley appears to make clear
that where no reason supports a state's deprivation of life, liberty, or property, the action
is arbitrary and capricious. 454 Moreover, substantive due process can be used in its
incorporative sense, thereby imposing the limits found within the fourth, fifth, and
eighth amendments. 455 In short, substantive guarantees exist to protect rights and lib-
erties.
Even more fundamental, however, is that this Article's proposed analysis is indeed
a utilitarian approach to rights and liberties. The current Supreme Court has apparently
made a conscious decision to protect itself and the lower federal courts from the recent
avalanche of section 1983 claims. 0" This is understandable, as the federal courts cannot
remedy every wrong that occurs throughout the country. But in order to protect itself,
the Court has made unnecessary, and unfounded, statements about the Constitution. 457
Rights and liberties thus risk being snuffed out in the name of docket-control, unless
some logical solution exists. The solution urged here would restore procedure to its
proper role and permit the future unimpeded development of substantive freedoms and
liberties.
4'9 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 322-25 and accompanying text.
451 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
452 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
455 See supra notes 371-82 and accompanying text.
454 See supra notes 415-32 and accompanying text.
45 ' See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
456 Consider the comments of Justice Blackmun in his article. supra note 5, at 21:
Whatever else may be said about these decisions [Parma and Hudson], they have made
it difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff who has only a state-law tort claim against
a state officiol to hale the official into federal court under the guise of a § 1983 action.
The Supreme Court gives ample evidence of being able to devise protective measures
for itself and other federal courts.
Id. This protection appears necessary in light of recent reports concerning the expansion of the
federal courts' caseloads. It is unfortunate, however, that the Constitution is the vehicle for avoiding
federal suits.
457 See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
